Fort Worth Criminal Defense

We were asked this week to name our law firm's greatest achievement.  Hmm... We've experienced quite a few successes over the past several years; acquittals, dismissals, no bills.  We've built strong relationships with people in the Fort Worth community.  We've been fortunate enough to help many clients.  But our greatest achievement...

After some thought, we knew our greatest achievement.

Our greatest achievement is the warm hug or firm handshake of a grateful client.

Just the other day we completed a criminal case in Tarrant County where the client's parents had come to court to watch.  After the case was over we had a chance to speak with the parents in the hallway of the courthouse.  Our client's mother was so thankful and through her tears asked if she could give us a hug.  That was the biggest compliment we could ever receive.  It was the overflow of her heart and in that moment, we knew we had made a difference in their lives.

We absolutely love what we do.  We get to help real people.  We are thankful for the opportunities to be a blessing.  We know that it is no accident when a client walks into our office.  Praise God for His plans and His purposes.

In any criminal case involving sexual exploitation of a child in the making, possessing, or distributing of child pornography, there is an issue of restitution to consider.  More specifically, if the child suffered monetary damages, who is responsible to pay restitution to the child to make him/her whole?  Is it the person that created the images, the person that distributed them on the internet, the end user that downloads and possesses the images, or everyone?  The courts were split on this issue.   Some held that every person along the way should pay their share of the damages.   Other courts held that each person is responsible for the total damages.

The Supreme Court has now weighed in the issue and has held that every offender is liable for their share of the damages, not more.   Below is the synopsis of the case wherein the Supreme Court considered this issue.

Issue: Is a person who was convicted of possession of child pornography liable to pay full restitution to the victim (the child subject) or should the court limit damages to only that which was proximately caused by the convicted person's actual role in the exploitation?

Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014)- Petitioner Randall Paroline pled guilty to possessing 150 to 300 images of child pornography, including two images of a girl named "Amy" being abused by her uncle at the age of eight or nine years old.  Amy's uncle took a number of photographs depicting her in sexually abusive poses, and distributed the materials over the Internet.   However, Amy first learned that images of her abuse were being trafficked on the Internet when she was 17.  This new information caused renewed trauma from the events that took place when she was a young girl and it made it difficult for her to recover from the abuse.

Amy then sought restitution under 18 U.S.C. §2259 from Paroline even though he was not the originator of the pictures. Paroline argued that a victim's damages must be proximately caused by the defendant's conduct because any other result would turn child exploitation restitution proceedings into a procedural nightmare. Amy argued that §2259 did not require proximate causation for a victim to be entitled to full damages; otherwise, the victims of child abuse would bear the burden of collecting tiny shares of restitution from several defendants and might never receive full recovery.

The District Court declined to award restitution because the Government had failed to meet its burden of proving what losses, if any, were proximately caused by the Paroline's offense. The Fifth Circuit held that §2259 did not limit restitution to losses proximately caused by the defendant, and each defendant who possessed the victim's images should be made liable for the victim's entire losses from the trade in her images, even though other offenders played a role in causing those losses.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision and held that restitution is proper under §2259 only to the extent the defendant's offense proximately caused a victim's losses. Victims should be compensated and defendants should be held accountable for the impact of their conduct on those victims, but defendants should only be made liable for the consequences and gravity of their own conduct, not the conduct of others. Where it can be shown both that a defendant possessed a victim's images and that a victim has outstanding losses caused by the continuing traffic in those images but where it is impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant by recourse to a more traditional causal inquiry, a court applying §2259 should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant's relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses. Therefore, in determining the proper amount of restitution, a court must assess as best it can from available evidence the significance of the individual defendant's conduct in light of the broader causal process that produced the victim's losses.

In short: each defendant pays his or her fair share of the victim's losses in a child pornography matter.

The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments a couple of weeks ago on Fernandez v. California.  HERE is Scotusblog's page on the case.

The case boils down to whether and to what extent a person may deny consent to search that is given by a co-tenant.  Below are the facts of the case.  A link to the oral argument audio is posted below.  We will be watching for a decision on this case as it stands to affect search and seizure law across the country.

FACTS: Police officers investigating an assault and robbery saw Appellant run into an apartment building.  Once they were inside the building, officers heard screams coming from one of the apartments.  The officers knocked on the door and Roxanne Rojas opened it.  When the officers asked Rojas to step outside so they could conduct a sweep of the apartment, Appellant stepped forward and told the officers not to enter.  The officers arrested Appellant for the assault and robbery and removed him from the scene.  The officers obtained consent from Rojas to search the apartment.  The officers seized weapons, gang paraphernalia and other evidence.

The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the apartment.  The California Court of Appeal held Rojas' consent to search the apartment she shared with Appellant was valid.

In Georgia v. Randolph, the United States Supreme Court held police officers may not conduct a warrantless search of a home over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident, even if another resident consents to the search. After Randolph, in United States v. Murphy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended Randolph, holding if a defendant expressly withholds consent to search, a warrantless search conducted after the defendant has left or been removed from the residence is not valid, even if a co-tenant subsequently consents. However, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as the Colorado and Wisconsin State Supreme Courts have rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Murphy.  These courts have held even if a defendant expressly refuses consent to search his residence, a co-tenant's consent obtained after the defendant leaves or is lawfully removed will support a warrantless search by police officers.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant's previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of his Fourth Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

The Court heard oral arguments in this case on November 13, 2013.  To listen to the audio from the arguments, click HERE.

*UPDATE:  Supreme Court issues decision in Fernandez.

PROSECUTOR POST - Here is a helpful tip from a Texas prosecutor on Trial Advocacy in the criminal courtroom:

After years of practicing in criminal courts, I've seen numerous courtroom styles from criminal defense attorneys. One of the most prominent is the "grandstand" (a.k.a. Posturing). I would define the "grandstand" as attempted behavior exhibited by an attorney to establish dominance in the courtroom. Please note that word - attempted. From yelling to whining to stomping around and slamming things on counsel's table, I've seen it all. Sometimes this behavior isn't intentional but actual passionate investment, but more often than not I can see it's a show for the client.

The client wants the bulldog lawyer in the courtroom. At least that's what I hear. I think some of what I'm referencing is an attempt by these lawyers to be that bulldog by "grandstanding." However, in my experience, these attorneys that "grandstand" in court, end up looking like the yipping chihuahua instead of the bulldog. And it's funny to see the look on the defendant's face when he realizes he's hired the yipping chihuahua.

The more effective style I've seen is the old German Shepherd approach. The attorney that comes in and exudes that high level of comfort in the courtroom. He's professional to everyone (including state's counsel) and acts in a way that sends the message to his client - "yes, I've been here several times before." Does he "grandstand?" No. He establishes dominance by respecting the balance b/w the defense, the state and the bench. Does he bark? Sometimes. But only when there's cause. And when he barks everyone hears it and respects it.

Although polygraph tests are used from time to time in criminal justice matters, they have always been inadmissible at court because they are inherently unreliable.

HERE, Sarah Roland, a Denton County Criminal Defense Attorney, informs us about a troubling opinion from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  A turning of the tide, if you will.  In Leonard v. State, the CCA overturned the 11th Court of Appeals (Eastland) and held that a polygraph test was admissible during a probation revocation adjudication against a person that was serving probation for a sex offense.

Because adjudication hearings are administrative proceedings, in which there is no jury and the judge is not determining guilt of the original offense, we hold that the results of polygraph exams are admissible in revocation hearings if such evidence qualifies as the basis for an expert opinion under Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705(a).

While the CCA is not saying that polygraphs will be admissible in an actual criminal trial, this "opinion is troubling," as Sarah puts it.  I agree.