July 2015

Article 42.12 Section 3(g), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure | 3G Offenses in Texas

A feature of the Texas Criminal Code that generates frequent questions is "3G offenses." The offenses are called 3G offenses because they were codified in section (3)(g) of Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure. The code has now been updated and the 3(g) offenses are listed in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 42A.054. As a practical matter, 3G offenses are generally considered more serious crimes. Many of the crimes are "aggravated" offenses, meaning that some circumstance makes the offense worse than the base offense.

The 3G offenses are:

• Murder
• Capital Murder
• Murder in specific aggravating circumstances, such as murdering a victim under 10 years of age, murder while committing another felony, murdering more than one victim, murdering a law enforcement officer or fireman acting in their official capacity, murder for hire or retaliatory murder against a judge
• Indecency with a child by contact
• Aggravated kidnapping--Kidnapping with the intent to hold the victim for ransom or as a hostage or with the intent to sexually or physically abuse the victim
• Aggravated sexual assault--Sexual assault in specific aggravating circumstances, such as a victim under 14 years of age, an elderly or disabled victim, using "date rape" drugs such as rohypnol or ketamine, causing serious bodily harm to the victim or another person, or attempting to kill the victim or another person in the course of the crime
• Sexual Assault
• Aggravated robbery--Robbery plus threat of bodily harm, exhibiting a deadly weapon or putting an elderly or disabled individual in fear of injury or death • Sexual assault
• Injury to a child (if offense is first degree felony)
• Sexual performance by a child under 18 years of age
• Criminal solicitation for commission of a capital offense (if offense is first degree felony)
• Compelling prostitution by force, threat, or fraud or, if the victim is less than 18 years of age, by any means
• Trafficking of persons
• Drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a school, youth center, or playground or on a school bus when the defendant has previously been convicted of a similar offense
• Burglary with the intent to commit another felony
• Any felony where a deadly weapon is used or exhibited during the commission of the crime or during the flight from the crime--Deadly weapon includes any firearm or other device designed to cause death or serious bodily injury or capable of doing so.

The important considerations for individuals convicted of a 3G offense are the implications for their sentencing and prospects for parole. Although the laws have changed over the years as various offenses have been added to the list, the current provisions apply to any crime committed on or after September 1, 2007.

 

Probation or Deferred Adjudication on 3G Offenses

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a judge cannot accept a plea bargain for straight probation (community supervision) on a 3G offense. A judge can, however, accept a plea bargain for deferred adjudication as long as the underlying sentence for the offense is 10 years or less. Deferred adjudication is similar to probation, except the judge defers a finding of guilt for the specified time of probation, and if the defendant successfully completes the probation, the charge is ultimately dismissed and no final conviction is entered on the defendant's record.

If a defendant exercises his right to trial on a 3G offense and is found guilty, only the jury can give probation. When a jury gives probation at trial for a 3G offense, it is considered straight probation because a final conviction of guilt is entered on the defendant's record.

Parole on 3G Offenses

Conviction for a 3G crime also affects an individual's prospects for parole. For any other offense, parole eligibility occurs when time served plus time for good conduct equals the lesser of 15 years or one-fourth of the sentence. However, for a 3G offense, an individual is not eligible for parole until actual time served, with no allowance for good conduct credit, equals the lesser of 30 years or one-half of the original sentence. If the original sentence was for any period less than four years, the individual is not eligible for parole until actual time served of two years.

Free Consultation with an Experienced Fort Worth Criminal Defense Lawyer

If you have been charged with a 3G offense, you need to speak with a criminal defense attorney as soon as possible. Our attorneys have years of experience handling 3G offenses in Texas. Call our team today to set up a free consultation in our Fort Worth office. We will take the time to answer your questions and help you take the next steps to protect your liberty.

Drug Crimes Can Come With Added Costs | Fort Worth Drug Crimes Defense Attorneys

Robert Ehrke was convicted of a drug crimes case - possession of between one and four grams of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone - and sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. The weight (1.6 grams) and composition of the substance were determined by a Department of Public Safety chemist.

In a pre-trial motion, Ehrke requested the trial court to provide for independent testing of the substance. Ehrke's attorney argued that, because 1.6 grams was so close to the 0.99 gram for a lighter sentence, independent testing was justified.

The trial court agreed it was required to allow Ehrke's counsel to inspect and examine the substance. However, because Ehrke did not demonstrate the need for the test or any reason why a second test would have different results, the judge denied the motion for independent testing. Ehrke's counsel's offer to secure payment for the testing did not change the judge's decision.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. The court based its decision on Ehrke's failure to show a particular need for independent testing or how an independent chemist would arrive at a different result.

On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the CCA identified two issues: (1) whether Ehrke had a right to inspection of the substance by an independent expert and (2) whether the state was required to pay for such an inspection.

The Court noted the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for a defendant to inspect evidence material to the state's case, but only if the defendant showed good cause for a request to inspect evidence. However, courts had found inspection mandatory if the evidence is material to the defendant's case.

The CCA said that in a controlled substance case, if the defendant asks to inspect the substance, the court must allow inspection because the substance will necessarily be material to the defense--no showing of good cause is required.

The CCA addressed the question of what an "inspection" entails. Obviously, simply looking at the substance, which is apparently all the trial court offered Ehrke's counsel, would not determine either its substance or its weight. The Court stated that in a controlled substance case, the right to pay for an independent chemist to analyze the substance is absolute.

On the second issue, the CCA acknowledged an indigent defendant's right to a court-appointed (read "court-paid") expert but said the defendant has the burden to provide specific justification for appointment of the expert. In Ehrke's case, the CCA said, no specific justification had been provided. Even though Ehrke's counsel explained the rationale for his request, he did not provide any evidence to question the original analysis by the DPS chemist, did not explain how independent testing was required for his defense and did not provide information regarding the complexity of the testing. According to the CCA, an absolute right to state-funded independent testing would be too great a financial burden to the County; therefore, appointment of an expert is required only if there is some preliminary evidence of a significant issue of fact to justify the appointment.

The Court remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings on the first issue.

The bifurcated decision in this case is perplexing. The Court said chemical analysis of an alleged controlled substance will always be material to a defendant's case and discarded the Code's requirement of a showing of good cause, making the right to independent testing absolute.

However, in the second issue, the Court seems to have abandoned its notion of materiality for a standard of affordability. On the part of the defendant, the Court cited case law that the state is not required to provide an indigent defendant with everything a wealthier defendant might be able to afford. More importantly, the Court concluded the financial burden to the County of paying for independent chemical testing in all controlled substance cases would be too great.

Examples abound of wealthy defendants procuring a better defense than an indigent defendant.  However, if an issue is always material to an indigent defendant's case to the point of making the right to independent testing absolute, it seems odd that the indigent defendant's right can be defeated by fiscal concerns of the County, which is in a much better position to pay for testing.

Contact our Drug Crimes Defense Attorneys Today for a FREE Consultation of Your Case at (817) 993-9249

Our Fort Worth criminal defense attorneys are experienced in defending drug crimes cases, including possession, possession with intent to distribute, manufacture, and more. If you are under investigation or have a pending charge, don't wait. Contact us today.

Years ago, I was employed as an assistant district attorney in a DA's office out in West Texas. From time to time, I would oversee the grand jury and the presentation of felony cases for indictment. At the first of every month, the county would summon potential jurors from a random selection process to serve on the grand jury. The first fourteen (twelve to serve as grand jurors and two as alternates) who were not disqualified by statute were seated on the grand jury.

Those fourteen citizens were always different. Different ethnicity. Different gender. Different religions. Different socio-economic status. Most importantly, different political parties. The goal was to create an impartial jury of peers to review the evidence in criminal cases and determine whether probable cause existed for indictment.

You can imagine my surprise when I moved to the DFW area and discovered jurisdictions here which used the other method of selecting grand jurors.

Article 19.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows the "pick a pal" method wherein judges can hand pick "jury commissioners" who individually select citizens to serve on the grand jury. As you can imagine, there has been a serious influence of politics on the grand jury process a result of this practice. It's hard to have an impartial grand jury when everybody comes from the same political party and economic sector of society.

Fortunately, House Bill 2150 was signed into law last month. On September 1, 2015, the "pick a pal" process will no longer be an option. Instead, the newly revised Article 19.01 will require all jurisdictions to apply the random selection process to the grand jury selection process.

This change is long overdue. An accused's right to an impartial jury should be the same at the grand jury as it is at trial.

Let me make an admission...sometimes we lose at trial. There, I said it. We don't win every case. Sometimes the evidence is not in our favor. Sometimes the State is able to prove every element of the alleged offense. And we typically know that going into it.

It begs the question, "Why take the case to a jury trial if you suspect you are going to lose?" Here's why...because in many situations, going to trial is the only way to get a good result.

For instance, we had a client that was charged with a low level misdemeanor offense. The State was offering a plea bargain of 18 months probation, a $1,250 fine, and numerous classes in exchange for a guilty plea. We considered this offer to be too steep in relation to the alleged offense. Our client agreed. But the State was not willing to budge on the offer. So we set it for trial.

After a hard fought trial, the jury came back with a guilty verdict, which is what we suspected all along. Then we went to the judge for punishment. The State continued to recommend 18 months probation and a $1250 fine. The judge, however, awarded our client 2 days of labor detail and a $750 fine. Two short days later, the entire ordeal was but a fleeting memory for our client. No probation. No monthly reporting. No random drug tests. No classes.

We would have never received such a low punishment offer from the State. We also would have never received such a low sentence from the judge if we hadn't gone to trial and filled her in on the extenuating and mitigating circumstances of the case and our client.

In criminal defense, a moral victory is still a victory and sometimes you win by losing.

Prostitution Case Overturned for Lack of Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause | Fort Worth Prostitution Defense Attorneys

- San Antonio 4th Court of Appeals (2015)
At approximately 9:00 p.m., San Antonio police officer Christopher Connelly and his partner observed Shamar Johnson "pacing" on the sidewalk in a dimly lit area near two gay clubs. Officer Connelly's testimony differs from Johnson's in some respects, but there is general agreement on the relevant facts. The area was known for gay prostitution. Based on their belief that Johnson had no reason to be loitering in the area, Officer Connelly and his partner pulled up to Johnson in their car, exited the vehicle and began questioning Johnson.

When Johnson saw the car, he stopped. According to Officer Connelly, Johnson appeared to be nervous and put his hands in his pockets. Johnson said that the presence of the officers on either side of him was intimidating. Officer Connelly instructed Johnson to put his hands on the patrol car and asked Johnson if he had anything illegal in his possession. Again, Johnson said that he did not believe he could leave and had to do exactly what the officers said. Johnson told the officers they could search him. The officers found a plastic bag containing cocaine and arrested Johnson.

Johnson moved to suppress the evidence the officers found because the detention and search were unlawful. The trial court found Officer Connelly's testimony "credible" and denied the motion to suppress. Johnson subsequently struck a plea bargain and pled no contest to the charge of possession of a controlled substance.

Johnson appealed the trial court's decision. Consistent with the standard for reviewing a trial court's action on a motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals deferred almost entirely to the trial judge, who was in the best position to assess credibility of witnesses, regarding the facts of the case, but made its own determination regarding how the law applied to the facts.

In a four-step analysis, the Court of Appeals found the officers' encounter with Johnson constituted an unlawful seizure and the motion to suppress should have been granted.

(1) Both sides agreed that the officers' encounter with Johnson was not consensual. The State admitted there was no support to argue the search was consensual.

(2) The state argued the officers' detention of Johnson was based upon reasonable suspicion, which requires the existing of specific facts leading an officer to conclude that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. The State cited the facts that Johnson was in a dimly lit area known for male prostitution and Johnson's "loitering" looked like someone who was engaged in prostitution. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that being present in a dimly lit area, even an area known for prostitution, does not provide reasonable suspicion that an individual is a prostitute. Because the officers had no reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson, Johnson's detention was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

(3) The Court considered whether Johnson's consent to search was an act of free will. The court noted the consent occurred shortly after Johnson was told to place his hands on the car and there were no intervening circumstances to lessen the "taint" of the improper detention. Although nothing indicated the officers intended to commit an unlawful detention, the Court found Johnson's consent was not an exercise of his free will and therefore did not remove the taint of the unlawful detention.

(4) After determining the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals considered whether that error made any difference in Johnson's punishment. Although Johnson accepted a plea bargain rather than go to trial, the Court of Appeals believed the denial of the motion to suppress gave the State leverage in the process and may have contributed to Johnson's giving up his right to a trial in order to obtain a favorable punishment recommendation.

Many people believe they are required to cooperate in any encounter with police until the police officers terminate the encounter. However, Johnson v. Texas makes it clear police officers do not have unlimited authority to detain an individual unless they have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed. While police officers may see reasonable suspicion where others would not and trial courts may agree, higher court decisions have set a standard for reasonable suspicion which limits police ability to detain citizens who, like Shamar Johnson, just appear to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.