CCA

Theft By Deception?  County Official Uses Airline Flight Voucher (Purchased with Government Charge Card) to Buy a Plane Ticket for his Son.

In Fernandez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the case of a Val Verde County Justice of the Peace who used an airline voucher for a flight that was unrelated to a government purpose.  The CCA discusses the offense of Theft by Deception in Texas, explaining what it means and what it doesn't mean.  It is an interesting case because it seems so petty - the amount was only 300 dollars and some change.  Why didn't the JP simply purchase a new ticket for his son?  Read more.

Travel Plans Arranged

James Fernandez was charged with “theft by deception” in 2012. Fernandez, serving as a Justice of the Peace in Val Verde County, wanted to travel to Orlando, Florida for a work-related conference in June of that year. After obtaining permission to travel to the conference and to use his government-issued credit card for airfare, Fernandez asked his office clerk to book the flight. The clerk made flight arrangements with Southwest Airlines.

Travel Plans Cancelled

Just before the conference, Fernandez became ill and cancelled his flight itinerary. Per Southwest Airlines’ refund policy, the airline issued a “refund-voucher” to Fernandez, in his name, valid for travel until February 2013. The refund-voucher was valued at $381.60, a dollar-for-dollar match to the amount originally paid for the ticket to Orlando.

In August, Fernandez asked his office clerk for the flight information from the cancelled Orlando trip. Once the clerk located the information, Fernandez told the clerk to give the flight reservation number to his son, Fernandez Jr.. The clerk complied.

Routine Audit Leads to an Investigation

During a routine review of the County’s flight budget, the County Auditor contacted Southwest, attempting to get a full refund of the flight. At that time the Auditor learned that the refund-voucher from the Orlando ticket had been used by Fernandez for a flight to Phoenix, Arizona in August. The auditor also learned that Phoenix flight incurred additional fees, fees that were not paid for by the county. Relying on Val Verde County’s policy that prohibits the use of county property for personal use, the auditor reported the transaction, triggering an investigation by the Attorney General.

Too Late to Repay, Fernandez Goes to Court

Soon after, Fernandez tried to pay for the airline voucher, but the auditor refused to accept his payment. Fernandez was charged with “theft by a public servant by way of deception.” At trial, Fernandez Jr. testified that his father had intended to repay the county, nevertheless, Fernandez was convicted—a conviction upheld by the Fourth Court of Appeals. Fernandez appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) for relief, arguing that State failed to prove he induced consent by way of deception at the time he misappropriated the government’s refund-voucher. The CCA must determine whether Fernandez committed “theft by deception” when he purchased online airfare for government-related travel with a government credit card, but canceled, using the refund-voucher for personal travel without “correcting the impression” that the refund-voucher would be used for future government-related travel.

What is Theft by Deception Under Texas Law?

Texas law defines theft as, “the unlawful appropriation of property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property.” Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(a). “Appropriation is unlawful if it is without the owner [of the property’s] effective consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). Consent is defined as, “assent in fact, whether express or apparent,” and is “not effective if it is induced by deception or coercion.” Id. § 1.07(a)(11); §31.01(3)(A). Deception means, “failing to correct a false impression…fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, that the actor previously created…by words or conduct, and that the actor does not now believe to be true.” Id. § 31.01(1)(B). The burden of proof is on the State to prove “that the owner of the misappropriated property was induced to consent to its transfer because of a deceptive act of the defendant.” Geick v. State, 349 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

The CCA Decides

Here, the CCA explains that “consent” is a key issue—that the initial consent Fernandez received from his office to use the government credit card to make the flight reservation was not the consent that is the basis of the conviction. Rather, it was the consent Fernandez obtained when he asked his clerk to send the information to his son, “because without the voucher number, Fernandez would have been unable to access the [information]” to book the flight to Phoenix. Further, the county, by way of its agent [the clerk], assented to the refund-voucher’s use because the agent gave the cancelled flight information to Fernandez and his son in August.

Moreover, the CCA says that the consent was obtained through deception. Fernandez established with his office that he would be attending a work-related conference in June, thus creating the impression that county funds were being used for a work-related purpose. Once the flight was cancelled, the refund-voucher that was issued is to be considered the county’s property, “just as the ticket to Orlando had been [considered county property].” Fernandez failed to correct the impression that he was using the ticket/refund-voucher for work-related travel, instead using the refund-voucher for personal travel without telling anyone in the Val Verde County’s business office. “By remaining silent, [Fernandez] left intact the impression he created…that the [refund-voucher] would be used for county-approved travel.” The CCA affirmed the decisions rendered by the trial and appeals courts.

Judge Johnson filed a concurring opinion that simplified the majority’s opinion. “When [Fernandez] failed to…tell the county….that he had not used the original ticket…and [did not] surrender the voucher, [Fernandez] failed to correct the impression of appropriate travel on county business that he had previously created.” This alone was the deception that is required to support the conviction.

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Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC is a criminal defense law firm in Fort Worth, Texas.  Our criminal defense attorneys handle all felony and misdemeanor offenses in Tarrant County and surrounding areas.  For more information about our attorneys, visit our Firm Profile page.

"Run, Baby, Run!" Girlfriend’s Warnings, Personal Tattoos, and Attempts to Flee From US Marshals, Do Not Rise to the Level of “Felony Hindering Apprehension” Says the CCA

Keiona Nowlin and her boyfriend, Demarcus Degrate, were riding in a car when a United States Marshal, executing a sealed, federal warrant on the boyfriend, pulled up behind them. After the Marshal activated the siren and lights, the couple pulled over and Degrate fled on foot. The Marshal chased Degrate. Moments later, as two Marshals arrived at the scene, they observed Nowlin screaming, “Run baby run…get away” while she also fled on foot. The Marshals detained Nowlin “to find out why she was running.” At that point, Nowlin fled the Marshals’ car. Nowlin was placed under arrest for escape.

See the CCA Opinion in Nowlin v. State.

After the arrest, Nowlin said she “knew the cars the Marshals drove…and…did not want Degrate to be arrested…[because] he was out on bond for state charges.” The Marshal noted that Nowlin had Degrate’s name tattooed near her collarbone; the trial court inferred the tattoo as indicative of an intimate relationship. The trial court found Nowlin guilty of third-degree felony hindering apprehension, sentencing her to four years imprisonment.

Nowlin appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that she was not warning Degrate of impending apprehension because “he was already aware of the [Marshal’s] presence.” Nowlin contended that because she did not know the contents of the sealed federal warrant, she could not have known Degrate was charged with a felony. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that her statement at the scene, “run baby run…get away,” provided sufficient evidence of providing a warning to Degrate. The court of appeals pointed to statements made at the scene that she knew “he was out on bond for state charges…and…she did not want her man to get arrested.” The court of appeals added that her tattoo was proof of her close relationship with Degrate, and that she likely knew of the felony-level charges he was facing.

Nowlin appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that because the federal indictment was sealed and secret, she could not have known about the indictment itself; that no evidence exists that she knew of the felony-level charges Degrate faced; and, that her tattoo was not proof of a close relationship where she would have had knowledge of the charges. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient: that the tattoo is evidence of a close relationship that implies she knew intimate details of Degrate’s life; that she knew Degrate faced serious state-level charges, and that her attempt to flee from the US Marshal is evidence of her knowledge of the “serious nature of Degrate’s crimes.” In an interesting turn of events, the State offered an alternative to acquittal--that an alternative charge could be misdemeanor-level hindering apprehension, and the sentence could be amended to reflect a lesser charge.

“In order to show that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support a conviction of felony hindering apprehension, the State must prove:

1. the defendant warned another person of impending discovery or apprehension;
2. the defendant had the intent to hinder that individual’s arrest; and,
3. the defendant had knowledge that the individual was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony.

Tex.Penal Code § 38.05(a), (d).

An individual acts with knowledge when he is aware that the circumstances exist. Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(b). In a nutshell, the State must show Nowlin was aware that her boyfriend was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) now decides whether the evidence is sufficient to show that Nowlin knew Degrate was charged with a felony offense.

Here, the CCA does not agree with the trial court and court of appeals. “The state offense that Degrate was on bond for cannot serve as the basis for [Nowlin’s] conviction.” The CCA notes that there was no evidence at trial that named the type and level of the state offense, therefore, the trial court had no way of knowing if the offense was a felony or not. Also, there was no mention of whether Nowlin knew what type of charge her boyfriend was facing. Therefore, because there was insufficient evidence regarding the state offense, the state offense cannot serve as the basis for Nowlin’s conviction.

Further, Degrate’s federal indictment was sealed. There was no way for Nowlin and Degrate to know about the charges before their arrests. “With this mandated secrecy and the lack of evidence that he was told about the indictment during the attempt to arrest him, Degrate could not have known that he was under indictment for felon in possession of a firearm.” It would have been impossible for Degrate to have told Nowlin about the felony charge because he would not have known about it.

Lastly, the inferences made about Nowlin’s close relationship with Degrate—including the tattoo on her collarbone and her attempt to escape the Marshall—do not apply here. “While the inferences that the court of appeals makes would likely be reasonable ones had there been any evidence of Degrate himself having knowledge of the indictment, no such evidence was ever presented.”

The CCA found that the evidence was insufficient to support a felony-level hindering apprehension charge. The CCA reforms Nowlin’s convictions to a misdemeanor hindering apprehension charge, instructing the trial court to conduct a new punishment hearing to reflect the lesser charge.

CCA Says “No Relief” for Defendant Who Accepted Plea Deal, even though the Court Infers Defendant’s Lab Reports Were Falsified

Setting the Stage: The Houston Crime Lab Scandal

In January of 2012, the Texas Rangers investigated a Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Crime Laboratory technician, Jonathan Salvador, for allegedly tampering with crime lab evidence. The Rangers questioned DPS technicians and reviewed evidence records, bringing information that pointed to Salvador’s mishandling of lab results to Harris County’s District Attorney’s office. However, after an extensive investigation, the grand jury did not indict the technician. Subsequently, the DPS Office of Inspector General issued a report, stating that Salvador “failed to properly follow laboratory protocols…misidentified substances, and dry-labbed [falsified] samples.” Following the report, Salvador was terminated from his position at the Houston Crime Lab.

The fallout from Salvador’s actions, “call…into question the veracity and reliability of many cases handled by Salvador…[and as a result courts have] granted relief on several writs of habeas corpus, finding that each case involved a presumptive violation of due process.” Ex Parte Turner, 394 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (per curiam); Ex Parte Hobbs, 393 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (per curiam). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) has since “retreated from a presumption that due process was violated in every Salvador case, [instead] requir[ing] a showing of falsity and materiality.” Ex Parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 605.

How to Demonstrate a Due Process Violation from the Houston Crime Lab Scandal

In order for a defendant to prove that due process has been violated, the defendant must show (1) falsity—that his evidence from the lab or lab report was falsified; and, (2) materiality—that such falsifications/false reports were material to the outcome of the guilty verdict. Ex Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Falsity

The defendant bears the initial burden of showing falsity; the CCA “has implemented a five-part protocol to be used when a [defendant] raises an inference of falsity.” Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605.
A defendant shows falsity when:

1. The technician in question is a state actor
2. The technician has committed multiple instances of intentional misconduct in another case or cases;
3. The technician is the same technician that worked on the [defendant’s] case;
4. The misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in the [defendant’s case]; and,
5. The technician handled and processed the evidence in the [defendant’s] case within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct.

Materiality

A defendant bears the burden of persuasion with regard to materiality. Id. at 606. Materiality of false evidence is measured by the impact it had on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Id. In cases involving plea agreements, the court examines the voluntariness of the plea—whether there is a reasonable likelihood that [the plea] affected the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, [but] not whether it affected the conviction or sentence. Id. The Court ponders questions like, “if the defendant had known that the lab reports were falsified, would he have plead guilty, or would he have gone to trial?” A plea, however, is not involuntary simply because a defendant does not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision [to take the plea]. Ex Parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). The CCA implies that the decision to “go to trial” is an indicator that the false evidence is indeed material; the decision to “take a plea deal” is a soft indicator that the false evidence is not material.

Applying this to Ex Parte Barnaby

On March 13, 2009, Kemos Marque Barnaby was stopped for a traffic offense. During the traffic stop, police smelled an odor of marijuana coming from inside the car. Barnaby was asked to exit the vehicle, and he consented to a pat-down search. With dashboard cameras rolling, a small plastic bag with white rocks, which tested positive for cocaine during a rapid field test, was found in Barnaby’s pants. The bag was delivered to the Houston Crime Lab, where Jonathan Salvador issued a drug analysis report, identifying the white rocks as cocaine. Instead of going to trial, Barnaby plead guilty to four separate offenses of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in exchange for four concurrent fifty-year sentences. Barnaby appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that because of Salvador’s false report, his guilty plea was involuntary, and had an impact on his decision to take the plea deal.

Here, the Court examines falsity to determine whether due process was violated. Using the five-part falsity protocol, the Court says, (1) Salvador was a state actor; (2) Salvador had multiple instances of misconduct; (3) Salvador worked on Barnaby’s case; (4) Salvador’s misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in Barnaby’s case; and, (5) Salvador handled Barnaby’s evidence in the same time period as the other misconduct at the Houston Crime Lab. The State conceded that Barnaby was able to raise the inference of falsity, and accordingly the Court infers that Salavador’s report in this case is false, carefully noting that an ‘inference of falsity’ is not an affirmative finding of a negative cocaine test result.

Next, the Court examines materiality to determine whether the false lab report was material to the decision to take a plea bargain and whether the value of the undisclosed information was outweighed by the benefit of accepting the plea offer. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, the Court says that Barnaby, a habitual offender, was faced with four drug charges, on top of having two prior felony convictions, thus, enhancing sentencing guidelines ranging from 25 to 99 years imprisonment for each charge. On top of that, Barnaby was also charged with three additional charges of possession with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, all of which were also enhanced to the habitual-offender statute. The plea resolved all four of those charges in exchange for four concurrent fifty-year sentences; “even if the falsity of the laboratory report had come to light…the State could have still prosecuted [Barnaby] for the three other [drug-free zone] cases. “[Barnaby’s] assertion that he would not have plead guilty had he known of the falsity of the laboratory report is unpersuasive in light of the benefit he received from the plea bargain.”

Even though the Court infers “that the laboratory report in [Barnaby’s] case was falsified, [the Court] finds that [such] falsity was not material to [Barnaby’s] decision to plead guilty,” adding that he received a benefit of a lighter prison sentence by choosing to take the plea deal. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief to Barnaby.

We've recently seen experienced drug lab problems in Fort Worth as well.  The problems have impacted countless drug and DWI cases in Tarrant County.  Any case that involves an outside crime lab must be scrutinized carefully by the criminal defense attorney.  While bad lab techniques (or technicians) might not mean an acquittal, but it could mean considerable relief for the defendant.

When I think of someone impersonating an attorney, my mind goes to Joe Pesci and My Cousin Vinny.  In the movie Vincent Gambino only impersonated a criminal defense lawyer (not a public servant) so nobody seemed to care (except the judge), but in Texas, Impersonating Public Servant (including a district attorney) is a serious matter.  Robert Cornwell found this out after he pretended to be a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney in hopes of helping his friend with a DWI case.

In May of 2012, Robert Cornwell called Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney Kourtney Teaff, identifying himself as an assistant district attorney from Dallas County, attempting to “resolve [his friend’s] [DWI] case.” Cornwell claimed access to criminal histories, case files, and fingerprint cards. He mentioned speaking with governmental offices, and prosecuting his nephew for drug possession. Cornwell insisted on using his personal cell phone number because he and Teaff “were on the same team.” Becoming suspicious of the “highly unusual” requests coming from another district attorney, Teaff recorded the conversations. According to the trial court, Cornwell always used his real name, he had never been an attorney in Texas, he never attempted to claim official authority over Teaff, and he intended that “Teaff should consider the requests a personal favor.” Cornwell was sentenced to two years imprisonment for impersonating a public servant.

See the opinion in Cornwell v. State

What does "Impersonating a Public Servant" mean in Texas?

Impersonating a Public Servant is a Third Degree Felony with a punishment range of 2-10 years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine.  A person violates Section 37.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code when the person impersonates a public servant in combination with the requisite intent...[which] can be satisfied with either the submission theory (“with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority”) or the reliance theory (“with the intent to induce another…to rely on his pretended official acts.”).

Cornwell appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show either theory of intent—submission or reliance—because he did not persuade Teaff to submit to any asserted authority he might have over her. The Court of Appeals rejected Cornwell’s argument, “concluding that the evidence was…sufficient to support a jury finding that he had impersonated a public official with intent to induce another to rely on his pretended official acts—the reliance theory.” Cornwell then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) for discretionary review.

Here, the CCA determines whether the Court of Appeals was incorrect in misconstruing the meaning of the Section 37.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, as only “a few Texas appellate courts have directly addressed the reliance theory of intent, and specifically, the meaning of pretended official acts.” See Ex Parte Niswanger, 335 S.W.3d at 617 & n.11; Tiller v. State, 362 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d.); Tovar v. State, 777 S.W.2d 481,489 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d.).

The CCA Clarifies what "Impersonating" means (and doesn't mean).

The CCA explained that Section 37.11(a)(1) can be broken down into two parts: the culpable act (actus reus, the bad act) and a culpable mental state (mens rea, the guilty mind). To violate the statute, the State must prove:

1. that the impersonation happened and
2. that the impersonator had the specific intent to induce another to submit or to rely upon.

“An accused may not be convicted on a simple showing that he falsely held himself out to be a public servant.”

Because it was undisputed that Cornwell did impersonate a public servant—an assistant district attorney from Dallas County—satisfying the first part of the statute, the CCA focused on Cornwell’s mental state, specifically the reliance theory—the evidence that shows Cornwell’s intent to induce another to rely upon his pretended official acts. The CCA explained that Cornwell attempted to persuade Teaff he was “an experienced assistant district attorney by relating various claims of conduct he had undertaken as an assistant district attorney” namely, “putting his nephew in jail, reviewing case files, and investigating matters in the capacity of assistant district attorney.” The CCA is adamant that, “the only reason [Cornwell] could have had for relaying these pretended official acts to Teaff was to enhance the credibility of his claim to be an assistant district attorney.” “By calling and speaking to an assistant district attorney as a member of the same team, [Cornwell]…hoped to gain [Teaff’s] trust and goodwill.” Further, Cornwell did not ask for favor[s] in his capacity as a private citizen or concerned friend, rather, he asked under the guise of being an assistant district attorney. The CCA states, such “purported actions exceed mere false identification as a public servant.” The CCA agreed with the Court of Appeals, affirming Cornwell’s conviction and sentence.

There are no shortcuts to due process. The Texas Penal Code prescribes strict punishment for those impersonating officers of the court. There is no doubt that criminal charges and allegations can make the accused feel panicked and overwhelmed, however, the old adage “desperate times call for desperate measures,” will not hold water in court where impersonation is concerned. If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, contact an actual Texas attorney who will explain the proper steps in dealing with the legal system. Contact our office today for a free consultation at (817) 993-9249.

Driving in the “Passing Only” Left Lane for Forty-Five Seconds Creates Reasonable Suspicion for Warrantless Traffic Stop in Texas

Jaganathan v. State: Francheska Jaganathan was driving in the left lane of a three-lane Texas highway, just ahead of a police cruiser. Mounted with a dashboard camera, the cruiser accelerated and changed lanes, but stayed behind Jaganathan’s car. A few seconds later, Jaganathan’s car passed a “Left Lane for Passing Only Sign,” yet her vehicle continued in the left lane despite the middle lane being clear of traffic. About forty-five seconds later, the trooper turned on his overhead lights, and conducted a traffic stop of Jaganathan’s car. During the traffic stop, the trooper smelled marijuana, prompting a search of the vehicle. The trooper found marijuana in the trunk, and as a result, Jaganathan was charged with possession of marijuana.

At trial, Jaganathan filed a motion to suppress the evidence, but the court denied the motion. Jaganathan chose a plea agreement where she pled guilty and was placed on deferred adjudication. On appeal, Jaganathan argued that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop in the first place. The court of appeals agreed with her, stating that Jaganathan likely stayed in the left lane for safety reasons, that seeing the cruiser may have influenced her decision to stay out of the trooper’s way, and that a few seconds were an insufficient amount of time “to conclude that [Jaganathan] committed a [traffic] violation.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas disagrees with the court of appeals, citing the reasonable suspicion standard in Texas, and the Texas Transportation Code. The Court of Criminal Appeals also clarifies the issue at hand.

The issue is not whether Jaganathan committed a traffic offense, but whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.

First, “A trooper may make a warrantless traffic stop if the reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied.” Guerra v. State, 432 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the trooper has specific and articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged …in criminal activity.” Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Second, “an operator of a motor vehicle [must] comply with an applicable official traffic-control device, including a sign.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 544.004(a); § 541.304(1). “Before a trooper can have reasonable suspicion to believe that a defendant committed the traffic offense of failing to obey a “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign, the trooper must be aware of facts that support a reasonable inference that the defendant drove past the sign before being pulled over.” Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 549.

Here, Jaganathan was driving in the left lane without passing other cars, after driving past a sign that prohibited that conduct. The dashboard camera captured the sign and all of the movements of the car. According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, even if Jaganathan had a defense of necessity—she HAD to be in the left lane for a medical or traffic emergency—the trooper still had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals states, “these were only possibilities, and so it was reasonable for [the trooper] to suspect the appellant had violated the law.” Further, the reasonable suspicion standard “accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). As a result of the forty-five second traffic violation, the trooper had reasonable suspicion to pull Jaganathan’s car over; and, as a result of smelling marijuana, the trooper was able to search the car without a warrant, resulting in charges against Jaganathan. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

It is important to note, however, that the ruling has a dissenting opinion. Justice Meyers is adamant that the sign and the Transportation Code supporting it are problematic for the following reasons:

• The Code is unclear on how to comply or not comply with the sign.
• The Code does not state a specific amount of time a driver has to pass and merge back into the non-passing lane.
• The Code does not address passing a string of cars, in the middle lane.
• The Code does not address the need to accelerate to be able to pass, whether intended or unintended (for example if the car being passed speeds up, making passing difficult).
• Proving a driver’s intent to pass another car is difficult.

If you or a loved one are facing traffic violations or drug charges, please contact our office for a free consultation at (817) 993-9249.