4th Amendment

“On Sunday, he advised me that he had been in Russia” is not the same as “He advised me that he had been in Russia on Sunday.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals considered a similar ambiguity in an Affidavit for a search warrant in State v. McClain. The Affiant stated in the affidavit, “In the past 72 hours, a confidential informant advised” the defendant had been seen in possession of Meth. Without more, this purports to state that the informant provided the information in the past 72 hours and DOES NOT state when the informant actually observed the behavior – a critical piece of information, indeed.

The trial court found the affidavit deficient and suppressed the evidence that was seized during the search. The 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) affirmed. The CCA now reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the search warrant based on this affidavit was proper.

The CCA cautions trial courts not to view such affidavits in a “hypertechnical” manner.

Since the Fourth Amendment strongly prefers searches to be conducted pursuant to search warrant, the United States Supreme Court has provided incentives for law-enforcement officials to obtain warrants instead of conducting warrantless searches. One incentive is a less-strict standard for reviewing the propriety of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. In this situation, courts must give great deference to the magistrate’s probable-cause determination.

The CCA, with the exception of Judge Johnson who dissented, held that the lower courts violated the prohibition on hypertechnical review of warrant affidavits when it strictly applied rules of grammar and syntax in its analysis. The CCA further held:

Reviewing courts should only be concerned with whether the magistrate’s determination in interpreting and drawing reasonable inferences from the affidavit was done in a commonsensical and realistic manner. And reviewing courts should defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made.

Is there really such a thing as a Consensual Police Encounter that ends with an arrest?

In Castleberry, the defendant and a friend were walking behind an Uncle Julio’s restaurant in Dallas. They were not engaged in and did not appear likely to engage in criminal conduct. A Dallas police officer approached them and asked for identification. The defendant reached for his waistband. The police officer then ordered appellant to place his hands in the air. The defendant grabbed a baggy of cocaine from his waistband and tossed it on the ground. The trial court suppressed the cocaine, reasoning that the officer did not have “reasonable suspicion” to justify the stop. The 5th District Court of Appeals agreed.

The CCA, on the other hand, held that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard and characterized the stop as a consensual police encounter. Writing for the majority, Judge Keasler, stated:

Even if the officer did not tell the citizen that the request for identification or information may be ignored, the fact that a citizen complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature of the encounter…We conclude that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would have felt free to decline [the officer’s] request for identification and information.

The obvious question then becomes, what would the CCA preferred the defendant to do? “No, thanks officer, I prefer not to provide any identification or tell you what I am doing. Thank you. Have a nice night.” Had the appellant said that, there is no doubt the court would now be using his noncompliance to justify a more intrusive search. There is absolutely no way for the defendant to win here.

The opinion goes on to suggest police officers (even when they are in uniform) are just like any average citizen.

Because an officer is just as free as anyone to question, and request identification from, a fellow citizen, [the officer’s]conduct shows that the interaction was a consensual encounter.

Ultimately, the CCA reasons that because the defendant could have been reaching for a weapon when he reached into his waistband, the officer’s further pat-down search was justified under Terry.

The CCA concludes:

The Court of Appeals failed to separate [the encounter] into two distinct parts: (1) [The officer’s] initial approach of [the defendant], which was a consensual encounter; and (2) [The defendant’s] act of reaching for his waistband, which provided [the officer] with reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk [the defendant]. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’s judgment, hold the seized contraband to be admissible, and remand the cause to the trial court.

After being convicted of aiding and abetting mail fraud and aggravated identity theft, Lonnie Oliver Jr., challenged his convictions on appeal, arguing that federal agents conducted an illegal search of the contents of a cardboard box that his girlfriend provided to them and that his statements to police officers were involuntary.

See the full opinion in United States v. Oliver  (5th Circuit, 2011)

Mr. Oliver left an unsecured cardboard box, which contained ample evidence of his identity theft operation, in the dining room of his girlfriend's apartment. When agents interviewed his girlfriend, she gave them the box, but did not tell them she had already examined its contents.

Does a person have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the contents of a box that was not kept private from his girlfriend?

The court held that the girlfriend’s prior search of the box destroyed Appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and rendered the subsequent warrantless police search permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court stated that the girlfriend’s search made the agents’ warrantless search permissible, regardless of whether the agents knew about it. The court cautioned that his holding was limited to the unique facts of this case and was not intended to expand significantly the scope of the private search doctrine.

Does a waiver of Miranda Right to remain silent need to be in writing?

Appellant also argued that incriminating statements he made to the agents during his custodial interrogation should have been suppressed, claiming that he had not waived his Miranda rights. After agents arrested Appellant, they advised him of his Miranda rights and provided him two forms. Appellant signed the first form acknowledging that he understood his rights, but he refused to sign the second form waiving those rights. Nevertheless, Appellant told the agents that he wished to answer their questions and he confessed to his role in a mail fraud and identity theft scheme.

The Court explained that suspect may waive his Miranda rights if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The mere refusal to sign a written Miranda waiver does not automatically make subsequent statements by a defendant inadmissible. The court held that the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s arrest and interview established that Appellant’s waiver was voluntary, even though he refused to sign the wavier form. Specifically: (1) agents provided Appellant with a copy of the Miranda warning waiver form and read it aloud to him as he followed along, (2) Appellant expressly told the agents that although he would not sign the Miranda waiver form, he would discuss the fraud scheme, (3) Appellant never requested an attorney, (4) Appellant was articulate, coherent and not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and appeared to understand what was going on, (5) Appellant clearly understood his rights since he signed the first form that acknowledged this, and he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system, and (6) Appellant was not coerced in any way during the interview.