News and Insights

Continuing our weekly look at obscure Texas laws (in no particular order), here is one that gives a whole new meaning to the phase "Give me a hand."

Section 48.02 - Prohibition of the Purchase and Sale of Human Organs

Under this law, it is a Class A mismedeanor if a person "knowingly or intentionally offers to buy, offers to sell, acquires, receives, sells, or otherwise transfers any human organ."

Of course, there are exceptions for blood and plasma, and more exceptions for medical transplants.  I cannot imagine that this law is charged very often, but it would not be on the books if it hadn't been a problem at some point in time.  Perhaps the lawmakers were concerned with the urban legend in which the person wakes up in the bathtub of ice and both kidneys missing.

Back in February, we alerted you to the Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. Bryant regarding testimonial v. non-testimonial statements.  I wanted to re-post on this case and take a deeper look at what has changed as a result of the Supreme Court’s opinion.

The Bryant court came up with a new test to evaluate what types of statements made to law enforcement are testimonial.  Before Bryant, Crawford basically stated that statements made during interrogations qualified as testimonial.  But, Crawford was just the tip of the iceberg.  After Crawford, the Court in Davis v. Washington specifically addressed statements made to officers to enable them to respond to an ongoing emergency.  The Court held that those statements are non-testimonial.  The problem was that the Court in Crawford and Davis failed to give us a clear test to determine what types of statements would be non-testimonial.

Finally, the Court decided Bryant, giving us a test. Under the Bryant test, courts must consider three factors:

1) The circumstances of the encounter;

2) The questions and statements of the participants; and

3) The primary purpose of the interrogation as viewed by reasonable participants at the time.

The case was consistent with Crawford.  Analyzing the facts in Crawford, we can see that a 911 call reporting an ongoing assault would still be held non-custodial under the Bryant test.  The circumstances of the encounter was that there was an ongoing emergency taking place, the questions and statements of the participants were specifically in relation to the 911 call and the primary purpose of the 911 call was to report an emergency.  The Bryant court ultimately held that if the primary purpose of the statement is not for the purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony, then the Confrontation Clause does not apply.

For all practical purposes, Crawford seemed to give a blanket exception for all 911 calls as being non-testimonial.  By giving us a test, the Supreme Court left each statement to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Could a 911 call be considered testimonial?  If evaluated under the Bryant test, and the right circumstances exist, we think it could be.  This argument could have been made even after the Crawford decision came down, but it may be easier to point the court to the Bryant test when arguing that statements made were subject to the confrontation clause – even if there is an emergency situation taking place.

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)

Last week, Justice Quinn of the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) very thinly masked his disgust in a three-page opinion (designated for publication) aimed at an appellant and his attorney who claimed that the trial defense counsel had been ineffective.  A shot across the bow to other would-be appellate attorneys who might be considering an ineffective assistance challenge, Justice Quinn warns "It ain't a game folks; it's real lives we are dealing with."

The opinion (Nanez v. State) is short enough to read in about two minutes so I won't reprint much of it, but here is, IMO, the best paragraph:

Counsel is not ineffective simply because he did not do that which his accuser thought he should have done. Nor is he legally deficient simply because some attorney who enjoys the benefit of hindsight and cool reflection would have taken a different tact. Indeed, appellate counsel should not only recognize what is required by law but also use caution when calling someone ineffective. Those before us today should heed that admonishment when next they think about invoking the theory. Unfounded and undeveloped accusations like those uttered at bar needlessly belittle their human target and do little to serve a client’s interests. It “ain’t” a game folks; it’s real lives we are dealing with.

Texas has plenty of laws on the books that are obscure to the average Texan (including lawyers like me).  In an effort to educate the general public (since ignorance is no defense), I have decided to post one obscure Texas law (from the Texas Penal Code) every week, until I run out of (what I consider) obscure laws.  Here's the first one:

Section 42.13 - Use of Laser Pointers

Under Section 42.13 of the Texas Penal Code, it is a Class C misdemeanor to knowingly point the "light from a laser pointer at a uniformed safety officer, including a peace officer, security guard, firefighter, emergency medical service worker, or other uniformed municipal, state, or federal officer."

So I've never violated this law (to the best of my knowledge), but I am definitely guilty of making the family dog run around in circles chasing a laser light.  Perhaps there is another obscure Texas law that covers that.  We'll find out in the coming weeks.

Last year, I posted about a murder case wherein a Fort Bend County dog handler used three bloodhounds to conduct a "dog scent lineup" to match a suspect's body scent to the scent of certain evidence from the crime scene.  In that case, the CCA ruled that the scent evidence was not enough to establish that the suspect had committed the murder.  The CCA did not comment on the admissibility of scent lineup evidence.

Today, the First District Court of Appeals (Houston) issued an opinion in State v. Dominguez, another case involving the Fort Bend County dog handler.  Much like the last case I posted about, the dog handler was used to match a murder suspect's scent with the scent of certain evidence from the crime scene.  This time, however, the scent lineup evidence did not even make it to the trier of fact.  After hearing the views of competing experts, the trial judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible as unreliable.  Some of the flaws in the dog handler's methodology that the court noted were:

• He carries around his "blind" non-suspect scent samples (called foil samples) in ziplock bags;
• His foil samples are old samples, while the scent sample of the suspect is fresh;
• He does not do negative runs where the sample of the suspect is excluded;
• He uses multiple dogs during each test rather than allowing the dogs to work alone; and
• He is mostly self-taught and his methodology is something he created.

On appeal, the State argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to admit the evidence.  The First District upheld the trial judge's ruling, holding that it was reasonable for the trial court of conclude that the scent lineup evidence was unreliable.

Now the courts have intervened twice to smack down the Fort Bend County dog handler's "dog scent lineup" evidence.  The question is: will they keep using the dogs in Fort Bend or will there be three former police bloodhounds on Craigslist by the end of the week?