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Lilly v. State

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial in all criminal prosecutions.

Appellant Conrad Lilly, was charged with two counts of assault on a public servant while he was in prison.  The trial court sua sponte convened his trial in the prison-chapel courtroom in lieu of the local courthouse.  Appellant objected to his case being tried in the prison chapel and moved for a change of venue, arguing that his 6th Amendment right to a public trial was violated because "prisons are not open to the public and are more like military zones than public places."  The trial court denied his change of venue request and the 11th Court of Appeals (Eastland) affirmed.

To support his claim, appellant pointed out the following facts to show that, as applied in his case, the prison chapel trial violated his constitutional rights:

1. The prison is protected by double razor fences, locked metal doors, and high-security procedures;
2. Only people listed on an inmate-defendant's approved visitor list could enter the branch courthouse to attend proceedings (only 10 names can appear on that list and the names can only be modified once every 6 months);
3. Media and other members of the public would be prohibited from entering unless TDCJ officials in Huntsville preapproved the media's request;
4. People attempting to attend the proceeding could be denied entrance if they wore offensive clothing; and
5. Unaccompanied minors and people released from confinement within the last two years are prohibited from entering the prison at all.

In this case, "the court of appeals held that Appellant's trial was not closed to the public because there was no evidence that anyone was 'dissuaded from attempting' to attend, and no one was actually prohibited from attending his trial."  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with this analysis.  The focus of the inquiry, the CCA explained, "is not whether the defendant can show that someone was actually excluded.  Rather, a reviewing court must look to the totality of the evidence and determine whether the trial court fulfilled its obligation 'to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trial.'"

[E]ven though many of the individual admittance policies in this case would not, standing alone, necessarily amount to a per se closure, the cumulative effect of the Unit's policies undermines our confidence that every reasonable measure was taken to accommodate public attendance at Appellant's trial.

Having found that Appellant's trial was indeed closed to the public, the CCA further held that the trial court failed to make findings of fact on the record that justified closing Appellant's trial.  Because Appellant's 6th Amendment right to a public trial was violated, the CCA reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court, and remanded the case for a new trial.

The CCA refrained from considering or commenting on whether prison trials are inherently violative of the 6th Amendment, noting that there could be occasions where a "public trial" is held in a prison.

Below is a case update from the 5th Circuit (Federal)

U.S. v. Cooke, 5th Circuit, March 13, 2012

While appellant was in jail, federal agents approached him and asked for consent to search his house.  He refused.  A week later, while he was still in jail, federal agents went to his house to conduct a knock-and-talk interview.  Appellant’s house was a windowless structure that had two large sliding exterior barn doors.  Behind the barn doors was a large area with a dirt floor and a paved sidewalk path that led to a stoop and another set of doors.  Behind these interior doors were the living quarters where appellant, his wife and his mother lived.  When the agents approached the house, they noticed that one of the exterior barn doors was damaged, allowing them access to walk directly up to the interior doors.  Believing that knocking on the barn door would be futile, the agents walked through the open barn door and knocked on the interior set of doors.  Appellant’s mother answered the door and granted the agents consent to enter the house.  Once inside the house, the agents saw a shotgun shell and gun safe in plain view.  Based on these observations, the agents obtained a search warrant and found illegal firearms, ammunition and a bulletproof vest in appellant’s house.

Appellant argued that the agents unlawfully entered the curtilage of his house when they crossed the threshold of the barn door without a warrant or consent.  The court held that the area inside the barn doors, but outside the interior doors was not part of the curtilage, so the agents did not violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the area without consent or a warrant in order to knock on the interior doors.  First, the area had a dirt floor and a paved sidewalk that led to the interior doors.  Second, the contents of the area included non-operating washing machines and dryers, ladders, a grill and other items indicating that the space was used for storage.  Finally, the barn door was open wide enough such that the items stored there were exposed to the elements, the public could see into the area from the street, and anyone would reasonably think that they would have to enter and knock on the interior doors when visiting.

Appellant also argued that under Georgia v. Randolph the warrantless search was invalid because his mother’s consent to the agents’ entry into the house was trumped by his previous refusal to consent.  The court disagreed, stating that Randolph only applied to co-tenants who were physically present and immediately objected to the other co-tenant’s consent.  Here, appellant was not a present and objecting co tenant, but rather was miles away from his home and in jail when he objected to the search.

The Seventh and Eighth Circuits agree and allow searches under similar circumstances; however, the Ninth Circuit does not.

 (14th Court of Appeals) April 3, 2012

I observed a traffic congestion in the inside westbound lane [on Interstate 10 in Waller County].  Traffic volume was moderate.  I inspected further and observed a grey Chevrolet 4 door sedan . . . traveling below the prima facie limit of 65 miles per hour and Impeding Traffic.  I paced the vehicle, which was traveling at approximately 52 miles per hour . . . . I initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.

This traffic stop led to the search of the vehicle and the seizure of marijuana.  The driver of the vehicle was later convicted of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana.  The primary question on appeal to the 14th District Court of Appeals (Houston) was whether a vehicle traveling below the speed limit necessarily creates reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

The appellate court explained:

Under Texas law, a vehicle "may not drive so slowly as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law." Tex. Transp. Code § 545.363(a). "Slow driving, in and of itself, is not a violation of the statute; a violation only occurs when the normal and reasonable movement of traffic is impeded." Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2008, no pet.).

Noting that the only evidence at trial on this issue was the police officer's report which contains a conclusory statement that appellant was "impeding traffic," but no articulable facts (other than the speed of his vehicle), the court held that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress.

The dissent believed that there were enough facts in the record to support the stop, and would have upheld the trial court's ruling.

Analysis: While traveling below the speed limit may indeed be enough to get you pulled over, the officer must indicate, either in his report or on the stand at trial, what specific articulable facts led to the reasonable suspicion that you were "impeding traffic" such that his stop was justified. Short of that, it is an unreasonable stop under that law.

The District and County Attorney's Association was not too pleased with this opinion. Here is its analysis:

This is the kind of decision that drives me crazy. The officer testified that the defendant was "impeding traffic" based upon his slower speed. The trial court found and ruled in his favor. Should not the trial court's ruling be upheld? Unfortunately, this holding is line with a similar decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in which the court held that the State failed to prove that a defendant committed a traffic violation of following too closely because all that the officer testified was that the defendant was following too closely. I suppose that when an officer testifies that the defendant was "impeding traffic," you should then ask the officer, "In what observable way was the defendant impeding traffic?" Were cars having to constantly go around him? Were they honking? Still, a trial court's ruling should be upheld if it is supported by the record. Maybe the Court of Criminal Appeals will review this decision, especially since there is a dissenting opinion.

PROSECUTOR POST - Here is a helpful tip from a Texas prosecutor on Trial Advocacy in the criminal courtroom:

After years of practicing in criminal courts, I've seen numerous courtroom styles from criminal defense attorneys. One of the most prominent is the "grandstand" (a.k.a. Posturing). I would define the "grandstand" as attempted behavior exhibited by an attorney to establish dominance in the courtroom. Please note that word - attempted. From yelling to whining to stomping around and slamming things on counsel's table, I've seen it all. Sometimes this behavior isn't intentional but actual passionate investment, but more often than not I can see it's a show for the client.

The client wants the bulldog lawyer in the courtroom. At least that's what I hear. I think some of what I'm referencing is an attempt by these lawyers to be that bulldog by "grandstanding." However, in my experience, these attorneys that "grandstand" in court, end up looking like the yipping chihuahua instead of the bulldog. And it's funny to see the look on the defendant's face when he realizes he's hired the yipping chihuahua.

The more effective style I've seen is the old German Shepherd approach. The attorney that comes in and exudes that high level of comfort in the courtroom. He's professional to everyone (including state's counsel) and acts in a way that sends the message to his client - "yes, I've been here several times before." Does he "grandstand?" No. He establishes dominance by respecting the balance b/w the defense, the state and the bench. Does he bark? Sometimes. But only when there's cause. And when he barks everyone hears it and respects it.

Howes v. Fields is a U.S. Supreme Court Case that was released on February 21, 2012.  In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that there is no bright line rule for determining when an inmate is in "custody," such that Miranda warnings are required if officers wish to questions him about an unrelated crime.

While serving a jail sentence, a corrections officer escorted Fields to a conference room where two police officers questioned him about an unrelated crime.  At the beginning of the interview, the officers told Fields that he could leave whenever he wanted.  Fields eventually confessed to the crime.  The officers never advised Fields of his Miranda warnings or told him that he did not have to speak with him.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that any time an inmate is taken from the general prison population and questioned about a crime that occurred outside the prison, he is always in-custody for Miranda purposes.  Makes sense, right?
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court held that serving a term of imprisonment, by itself, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody.  When a prisoner is questioned, the determination of Miranda custody should focus on all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to include the language that is used in summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation is conducted.

In this case, the Court held that Fields was not in-custody for Miranda purposes.  Although the interview lasted between five and seven hours and continued well past the time Fields went to bed, the officers told Fields several times that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.  Additionally, the interview was conducted in comfortable conference room, the officers did not physically restrain or threaten Fields and they offered him food and water.  All of these facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.