News and Insights

As I'm sure you've noticed by now, specialty courts (drug courts, DWI courts, Mental health courts, reentry courts, etc.) are rapidly becoming the norm in most criminal jurisdictions.  Why the increase in popularity?  Simple.  They work.

The National Association of Drug Court Professionals' website cites the five primary goals these programs are working to achieve.

1) They reduce crime 2) They save money 3) They ensure compliance 4) They combat addiction 5) They restore families

Incarcerating addicts only delays their inevitable addiction cycle.  Specialty courts offer a real, life-changing alternative that not only aid individuals in their battle against addiction, but also improve the crime rates in every community in which they exist.  These specialty courts work to provide intense supervision through the cooperative efforts of local probation offices, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and, most importantly, judges. Read more about drug courts.

If you haven't researched specialty courts in your jurisdiction, I'd highly encourage you to do so immediately.  These programs could offer an incredible opportunity that may not have been available before.  Let's hope specialty courts continue to gain traction, and that more specialty court keep popping up throughout Texas.  It is important to remember that the criminal justice system is not always about punishment, it's also about rehabilitation.

In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court identified three factors that courts should consider when determining whether the taint of an unlawful arrest was attenuated prior to obtaining a confession:

1. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
2. The presence of intervening circumstances; and
3. The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct (in making the arrest).

In May of 2012, in State v Mazuca, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the proper application of the "attenuation of taint doctrine," not to a confession, as in Brown, but to contraband that is seized immediately following an unconstitutional detention or arrest.  The question presented was this:

Will the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in the relatively few moments that ensue between the illegal stop and the seizure of the contraband invariably serve as an intervening event sufficient to purge the taint of the primary illegality?

In Mazuca, an El Paso police officer stopped the car in which appellee was a passenger because the officer believed he saw white light (rather than red) emitting from the tail lights.  Photos at trial would later prove that the tail lights were indeed red and that the car was not in violation of the Texas Transportation Code.  During the stop, the officer requested to see appellee's driver's license, and quickly learned that appellee had outstanding warrants.  During the course of the stop (after learning about the warrants) the officer seized both ecstasy and marijuana from appellee.  Appellee moved to suppress the contraband as the fruits of an illegal search.  The trial court granted the motion, making, inter alia, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The driver of the Mustang did not violate Section 547.322 of the Transportation Code on December 11, 2008. 2. The Police Officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop on that date. 3. The arrest warrants of the Defendant did not purge the taint of the illegal stop due to the flagrancy of the police action, the close temporal proximity and the fact that no Miranda warnings were read.

The 8th Court of Appeals (El Paso) affirmed.  The CCA considered the Supreme Court precedent, as well as the Texas Court of Appeals opinions in coming up with the rule below:

When police find and seize physical evidence shortly after an illegal stop, in the absence of the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in between, that physical evidence should ordinarily be suppressed, even if the police misconduct is not highly purposeful or flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. Under this scenario, temporal proximity is the paramount factor. But when an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered between the illegal stop and the seizure of physical evidence, the importance of the temporal proximity factor decreases. Under this scenario, the intervening circumstance is a necessary but never, by itself, wholly determinative factor in the attenuation calculation, and the purposefulness and/or flagrancy of the police misconduct, vel non, becomes of vital importance.

While the rule sounds simple enough, the CCA's application of the rule to the facts of the case is a bit troubling.  The CCA reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that...

[T]he behavior of the arresting officers, although clearly unlawful at the outset, was not so particularly purposeful and flagrant that the discovery of the appellee's outstanding arrest warrants may not serve to break the causal connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of the ecstasy in the appellee's pants pocket, thus purging the primary taint.  We hold that the trial court erred to conclude otherwise.

The opinion in this case seems a logically disconnected from the ultimate outcome. Apparently, some of the judges agree.  Here's what Judge Meyers had to say in his dissenting opinion:

The result fashioned by the majority opens the door for police to ignore the probable cause requirement and make traffic stops without adequate grounds for doing so.  The majority's analysis of the weight of the Brown factors may be correct, but the result discounts the trial court's findings as to the credibility of the officers.

Judge Johnson dissented as well, writing:

I would hold that the court of appeals correctly recognized that, without the highly improper traffic stop, the officers could not have learned appellee's name, found active warrants, or searched him and recovered contraband, all fruits of the poisonous tree.  We, like the court of appeals, should "afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts that are supported by the record, particularly when such findings are based on an evaluation of witnesses' credibility and demeanor" and affirm its suppression of the evidence that was obtained because of the improper traffic stop.  I respectfully dissent.

If you were the subject on an unlawful arrest on a drug crimes case, contact the Fort Worth, Texas drug crimes defense lawyers at Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC today.  (817) 993-9249.

Tarrant County District Attorney Sharen Wilson

Sharen Wilson, who took office in 2015, is the elected Tarrant County District Attorney. She is the top of all Fort Worth prosecutors, managing a large office of Assistant District Attorneys, investigators, support staff, and even a therapy dog.  Prior to assuming her new role as the Tarrant County District Attorney, Sharen Wilson presided over Criminal District Court Number 1 as a District Judge.  Her office receives cases from the various police departments across Tarrant County, investigates the cases, and files misdemeanor or felony criminal cases.  The Assistant District Attorneys under Sharen Wilson present cases to grand juries and manage dockets in the 20 Tarrant County criminal courts and the Courts of Appeals.  If you are interested in observing a criminal trial in Tarrant County, check out the Tarrant County Trial Board for a list of cases each week.

Fort Worth Prosecutors | Tarrant County DA

The Tarrant County District Attorney office has over 150 Fort Worth prosecutors and over 50 investigators. The office has a budget of $38 million dedicated to criminal prosecutions and investigations in Tarrant County.  Colloquially, every Assistant District Attorney is referred to as a "Tarrant County DA" or "prosecutor," but the ultimate authority over criminal prosecutions is retained by Sharen Wilson.  Fort Worth prosecutors are known across the state as fair and collegial attorneys.  They have a reputation for taking a fair look at each case and providing all available information to the defense bar in a timely manner.  Although the Tarrant County District Attorney office is one of the largest in the state, in one of the largest counties in the state, the office and its staff carry themselves with small-town values.  While each criminal case is different and may have its own challenges, our criminal defense attorneys have always been satisfied with the professionalism of the Tarrant County DA office.

Free Consultation of Tarrant County Criminal Cases

Our Fort Worth criminal defense attorneys square off every day with the Tarrant County DA office. We have a proven track record of favorable results for our clients. We understand that every case and every client are different. We take a personal approach to every client and pursue every option to address our clients' individual needs. For a FREE consultation of your Tarrant County criminal case, contact our team at (817) 993-9249.

United States Supreme Court case highlight: Blueford v. Arkansas

The case dealt with the double jeopardy clause and whether it applies to partial or informal verdicts.

In Blueford, the defendant was being tried for capital murder.  The trial judge instructed the jury that if it did not find the defendant guilty of capital murder, it should consider the lesser included offense of first degree murder.  The court further instructed that if the jury did not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it should consider manslaughter...and so on and so forth.  After several hours of deliberations, the jury reported that it could not reach a unanimous verdict.  The judge inquired into how the voting was going and the jury reported that it had decided that the defendant was not guilty of capital murder or first degree murder, but that it could not agree on manslaughter.  The judge instructed the jury to go back and keep trying, but they were unable to break the impasse.  Accordingly, the trial judge declared a mistrial.

During the retrial for the same offense, the defendant objected on double jeopardy grounds to the charge of capital murder, arguing that the jury's informal verdict that he was not guilty of capital or first degree murder precluded him being retried for that same charge at a later trial.  The trial court disagreed, as did the appellate courts.

In a 6-3 opinion (Majority: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito), the Supreme Court held that :

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrying Blueford on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder.  The jury did not acquit Blueford of capital or first-degree murder.  Blueford contends that the foreperson's report that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the murder offenses represented a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in his favor.   But the report was not a final resolution of anything.  When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury's deliberations had not yet concluded.  The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, and nothing in the court's instructions prohibited them from reconsidering their votes on capital and first-degree murder as deliberations continued.  The foreperson's report prior to the end of deliberations therefore lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses.  That same lack of finality undermines Blueford's reliance on Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, and Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323.  In both of those cases, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson was not.

This holding appears to be consistent with Texas law, in that a jury foreperson must sign a verdict form and the court must accept the verdict, before it is given any legal significance.

Justices Sotomayer dissented (joined by Ginsberg and Kagan), and would hold that partial verdicts should be required before a mistrial is granted on the grounds of a deadlock.

I'll never forget something I heard back when I was going through Marine Corps Officer Candidate's School.  After somebody said "thank you" to a Drill Instructor, the Drill Instructor looked at the person (in a way only a Drill Instructor can) and responded "Don't thank me.  The government thanks me every two weeks!"

I felt a little like my former Drill Instructor recently as I was talking to a couple of my court-appointed clients.  For court-appointed cases, the county pays me to represent indigent defendants.  This doesn't mean that I have any obligation to help the county move cases or plead my clients guilty.  My only loyalty is to my client, regardless of who is paying the bill.

However, on two separate occasions last week, a court-appointed client offered to give me a little cash if I could help them get a better deal.  Like my former Drill Instructor, I did my best to explain there is no need to give me anything.  You'll get my very best even though the county is footing the bill.

Misconceptions abound when a defendant spends any amount of time in jail.  The jailhouse lawyers love dispensing their "legal knowledge."  One of the first "CLE's" that the jailhouse lawyers hold is the primer on court-appointed lawyers.  About how we are in cahoots with the State and how we are only interested in pleading the clients out at the first setting.  Not true.  At least not true in our criminal defense firm.

Of course there are times when the very best plea offer from the State comes at the first setting (as it should) and it is in the defendant's best interest to take it.  But not always.  And if we need to expand our investigation and do a little more negotiating with the prosecutor, or if we need to prepare for trial, then we'll do it.  No need to pay me any more money and no need to thank me (but a thank you is nice from time to time).