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Can I be Arrested for DWI for Sleeping in My Car?

One of the requirements for a DWI in Fort Worth is straightforward--the intoxicated individual must be "operating" a vehicle while intoxicated. Any DWI attorney in Fort Worth would tell you that basic requirement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently considered the question of whether an individual who is passed out in a running, yet stationary, vehicle is "operating" the vehicle for DWI purposes. In Murray v. State, the court answered in the affirmative.

Chad Murray was passed out in his running truck in the early hours of the morning. Deputy James McClanahan observed Murray's truck with its lights on, parked partially on the shoulder of Highway 22 and partially in a driveway near a fireworks stand. Deputy McClanahan observed exhaust coming from the truck but could not see anyone inside. The Deputy approached the truck and saw Murray asleep in the driver's seat. The truck was indeed running. The transmission was in "park," and the radio was on high volume. Deputy McClanahan finally succeeded in waking Murray up and, after Murray's bungled attempts failed, in obtaining Murray's ID. The deputy reported that he immediately smelled alcohol in the truck when Murray opened the window and that Murray appeared very intoxicated. Murray failed a field sobriety test and was charged with DWI.

At trial, Murray was found guilty and sentenced to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine. The jail sentence was suspended, and Murray was placed on two years of community supervision. Murray appealed his conviction to the Seventh Court of Appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove that he was actually operating his truck and that he was, therefore, not guilty of DWI. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Murray's conviction, holding that, although it was possible to infer from the circumstances that someone drove Murray's truck to the location where it was found, there was no evidence as to when that occurred or whether the driver was intoxicated at the time. The Prosecuting Attorney appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals based on the question of whether Murray could have been found guilty of DWI without direct evidence that he was operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

The CCA took exception to the lower court's conclusion, pointing to evidence that the vehicle was running, that Murray was in the driver's seat, that Murray was the only one in the vehicle and that he was the only person in the vicinity. The court also pointed to the fact that there were no alcoholic beverages or containers in the vicinity and that the Deputy's conclusion that Murray was very intoxicated was reasonable; Murray even admitted to the Deputy that he had been drinking. Because Murray was intoxicated, no one else was around, and there was no alcohol in the area, the court found it reasonable for the jury to infer that Murray had driven his truck to the location on Highway 22 and had done so while intoxicated.

Justice Meyers disagreed and in a dissenting opinion argued that allowing Murray's DWI conviction to stand was comparable to convicting someone for possession of marijuana based solely on the individual being high and smelling of marijuana. Justice Meyers believed that being passed out behind the wheel of a running vehicle is not enough to be considered "operating" the vehicle; operation of a vehicle requires some action to enable the use of the vehicle, even something as simple as turning the key in the ignition. For DWI purposes, there must be evidence that the action was taken while the individual was intoxicated. For Justice Meyers, inferring these facts from the evidence presented was a leap too big for a jury to make.

The case is instructive for anyone charged with DWI in Fort Worth. A trial jury will have wide latitude in drawing conclusions regarding whether you were operating the vehicle while intoxicated, even if an officer does not directly observe you doing so. If you find yourself in this predicament, you should consult a DWI attorney in Fort Worth. Do not assume that you will get off on a technicality. Chad Murray didn't.

Texas courts have routinely held that an expert witness, such as a child psychologist, may not offer an opinion about the truth of a certain child victim's specific allegations or about the truth of child victim allegations in general. But they haven't shut that door completely.

A couple of weeks ago, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) reaffirmed the legal principle that:

Expert testimony that a child did not exhibit indications of coaching or manipulation [does] not to constitute an opinion on the child's truthfulness.

In Cantu v. State, one of the defense theories was that the child victim had been coached by her mother to make false allegations against Appellant. To counter this theory, the State brought an experienced child interviewer from the Advocacy Center to testify that in her expert opinion, the child victim in this case did not exhibit any "red flags" that would indicate that she had been coached or manipulated. The State was careful not to elicit testimony that the victim was being truthful and thus, the conviction was affirmed on appeal.

To me, this is still an area ripe for objections at trial and a special inclusion in the jury charge. You may get a judge that will exclude it. Okay, probably not, but it's worth a shot. While most lawyers can see the technical difference between an opinion on truthfulness and an opinion on coaching, many jurors will not.

In the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created what are now commonly referred to as "Miranda Rights." These rights were created to mitigate the coercive effect of interrogations while a defendant is in police custody. Recognizing that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit forced self-incrimination, the Supreme Court mandated that defendants are made aware of these rights before any custodial interrogation begins, namely their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of an attorney. However, if a defendant is not in custody, police officers do not have to read him or her their Miranda Rights, despite being questioned about an alleged crime.

A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when he or she is placed under formal arrest, or a reasonable person would not feel free to leave during questioning. If a defendant feels free to terminate the interrogation at any time, they are not in custody. The Court uses five factors in their analysis: (1) the length of the questioning, (2) the location of the questioning, (3) the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning, (4) the amount of restraint on the individual's physical movement, and (5) statements made by officers regarding the individual's freedom to move or leave. Using these factors and the totality of the circumstance, the Court will determine if the restraint on one's freedom arises to the degree usually associated with a formal arrest.

In United States v. Wright, a search warrant was executed at the defendant's home in connection to an on-going child pornography investigation. A police officer escorted the defendant to his police car where the defendant could wait during the search. The officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest and could leave whenever he wanted. He was not handcuffed or restrained in any way. Before being questioned, the defendant was read his Miranda Rights and again told that he could leave at any time because he was not under arrest. The defendant made several incriminating statements that he later moved to suppress at trial, arguing that he had unambiguously requested an attorney to be present during questioning.

Nevertheless, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant was never in custody for Miranda purposes, so he was not entitled to the right of counsel, and thus the Court denied his motion. The defendant was made aware on at least two different occasions that he was not under arrest and that he could leave at anytime. Moreover, the defendant's movement was not restrained during questioning that prevented him from leaving, and his overall tone during the interview was cooperative since he was trying to tell his story to the police officer. Because of these factors, the Court held that the defendant's incriminating statements were admissible at trial.

As we continue to advise: Do not make any statements to the police when they are investigating you for a crime (regardless of whether you are in "custody'). Ask for an attorney and wait until you get one before you say anything.

Although the Fourth Amendment acts as a safeguard against unlawful search and seizures, the State can still use evidence it finds against a defendant in a consensual search of their property if the search is sufficiently detached from an illegal search that purges any unconstitutional taint. Accordingly, such a search is valid if the search was voluntary and an independent act of freewill.  In order to determine whether a search was an independent act of freewill, the Court analyzes several factors, none of which are controlling by themselves:

1. the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent,
2. the presence of intervening circumstances, and
3. the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct.

In US v. Montgomery, the Defendant was stopped by a police officer and frisked during a traffic stop in front of the Defendant's house. As the officer frisked the Defendant, the Defendant pushed the officer's hands away from his pockets after the officer felt a bulge. The Defendant revealed that the bulge was cocaine, prompting his arrest and Mirandizing. The Defendant, eventually, consented to a search of his house. During the search, the Defendant was allowed into the house to obtain medicine and made several requests to officers on scene for his cell phone to erase some "naked pictures" that he did not want his father to find. The Defendant consented to one of the officers using his phone to delete the pictures, but the officer found what appeared to be child pornography. The Defendant was later indicted for possession of child pornography.

At trial, the Defendant claimed that the frisk and seizure of cocaine that led to his arrest was unlawful, which tainted his consent for the officer the see his cell phone. Nevertheless, the Court held that even if the frisk and seizure were illegal, the Defendant's several voluntary and independent acts of freewill relieved the search of the Defendant's phone of any unconstitutional taint, specifically, the Defendant asking several times to see his cell phone so that he could delete the naked images, and the Defendant consenting to a search of his phone after being Mirandized. Nothing was presented at trial that showed the police officers even wanted to search his cell phone. In the words of the Court, "[The Defendant] broached the phone search himself." Moreover, the Court also cited several intervening events and factors establishing that the Defendant's "consent was sufficiently detached from the arrest to purge any taint" such as the officers reading the Defendant his Miranda rights, the Defendant's criminal record, and the Defendant going into his house to retrieve his medicine.

Yet another reason why we advise NEVER GIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH, period.

Posted by Luke A. Williams.

I recently attended - along with prosecutors, other defense attorneys, and law enforcement officers - a continued legal education course regarding wrongful conviction. The course kicked off with the study of a case out of North Carolina of two men (19 and 15 at the time of their convictions) who were recently exonerated via DNA evidence.

The men, Henry Lee McCollum and Leon Brown, both confessed to killing an 11-year-old girl in 1983. The question that immediately floated around the room was: why would these two boys confess to a horrific murder if they didn't actually commit the crime? It's a fair-enough question and probably the reason the jury that eventually found them guilty of the murder sentenced both of these boys to death. But - in the spirit of Paul Harvey - the "rest of the story" explained how these confessions were coerced.

There was no physical evidence that tied McCollum and Brown to the crime. The lead that was provided to investigators came in the form of a rumor from a fellow schoolmate of the boys who cast suspicion on them because they had recently moved from New Jersey - they were outsiders. Investigators took them in for questioning. Initially, they took in Henry. After five hours of questioning with no lawyer present and with his mother weeping in the hallway, not allowed to see him, Henry told investigators a story of how he and three other boys attacked and killed the girl. He was promised that if he confessed to the crime he would be released to his mother - he was 19 years old. His "statement" was typed out by the investigators and he put his signature to it after the 5-hour interrogation. The last thing Henry said after signing the confession was, "Can I go home now?"

After Henry's interrogation, Leon was brought in (at 2:30 a.m.). He was told that Henry had confessed and implicated Leon being involved as well. Leon was made similar promises and also told that he would be executed if he did not cooperate. After another lengthy interrogation, Henry also confessed to attacking and killing the girl.

Both men were tried and both men were sentenced to execution.

After 30 years, lawyers from the Center for Death Penalty Litigation began pressing for DNA testing of the physical evidence in the case, which included a cigarette butt found at the murder scene. The DNA was matched - but not to either McCollum or Brown. The DNA came back as a match to Roscoe Artis, a man who lived in a house yards away from the wooded area where the murder took place. Coincidentally, only a few weeks after the murder, Artis confessed to the rape and murder of another 18-year-old girl in the same town. The circumstances surrounding that murder contained striking similarities to the murder that McCollum and Brown were convicted of. Artis was implicated in a number of other murders that occurred in the same area and all under the same or similar circumstances. Based on the DNA testing and the investigation into Roscoe Artis, after 30 years in prison and on death row, McCollum and Brown were exonerated and released.

It's a story that, as a defense attorney and former prosecutor, I've heard before. While not the norm and certainly not common, it's something I know has happened. The key question though is, "does this still happen?" I was surprised when I overheard one of the members of law enforcement in the room exclaim that, "Oh, this would never happen these days." While I certainly agree that things have changed and drastically improved since the days of McCollum and Brown, I can't help but think that the mentality of the impossibility of this happening again is an extremely dangerous one.

I imagine if this case happened today; certainly DNA would be gathered and tested against suspects. But, what happens if there isn't any DNA at the scene (yes, this could still happen)? What happens if false or speculative accusations or suspicions occur again? What happens if false confessions happen again? In a horrific murder case, I think its naïve for anyone in the field of criminal justice to make a blanked statement that, "this could never happen again." It can and it will. We have a great justice system but not a perfect one - a human one.

Things have got better. Prosecutors, defense attorneys and law enforcement personnel have a heightened awareness of the possibility of a wrongful conviction. But, we all must remain vigilant and never put on blinders to the fact that it can happen again.