News and Insights

Should a defendant charged with possession of drugs be punished for a "dangerous weapon" found at the scene of the drug trafficking and owned by a co-conspirator, when he did not know about the gun in the first place?

On September 5, 2012, police were investigating a ranch in McAllen, Texas as a possible stash house for drug-trafficking. Officers observed Adrian Rodriguez-Guerrero coming and going from the ranch along with three other men in a caravan. When the officers stopped the caravan, “because the vehicles appeared weighed down,” a dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The police found “boxes of limes with bundles of marijuana concealed among the limes.” The defendants subsequently consented to a search of the McAllen ranch. (I'm always left wondering why people, especially those in possession of drugs, consent to a search.) “There the [police] found…clothing…a loaded shotgun and 125 shotgun shells…plastic cellophane, limes, packing tape…lime boxes, latex gloves, a large scale, and several bundles of marijuana.” In a written statement accepting responsibility, Rodriguez-Guerrero said he was hired to do landscaping at the residence, but was asked to “load the marijuana into a truck at the [ranch]…acknowledg[ing] the [ranch] as a stash house [for drugs].”

Conspiracy to Possess and Distribute Marijuana Enhanced for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon

At trial, he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, receiving a “guidelines-range sentence of 104 months” imprisonment and four years of supervised release. His sentence included a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon—the shotgun found at the McAllen ranch. The district court noted, “[the Court] is not finding Rodriguez-Guerrero possessed the shotgun; rather, it was reasonably foreseeable…that there would be a weapon involved in…the… drug trafficking crime.” The district court added, “the shotgun was a tool of the trade and it [is] reasonably foreseeable to [Rodriguez-Guerrero] that there would have been a weapon, especially [to] a person with the experience that he has in drug trafficking.” Rodriguez-Guerrero appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, stating that there was no evidence to support a finding that either he or a co-conspirator possessed the shotgun—possession which lengthened his prison sentence.

U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Application When a Dangerous Weapon is a "Tool of the Trade"

The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides a two-level sentencing enhancement if “a dangerous weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon is connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.11(A). “The government must prove weapon possession by a preponderance of the evidence…[and can do so] by showing a temporal and spatial relationship of the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United States v. Zapata-Lara, 615 F.3d 388-90.

Here, the Fifth Circuit Court reasons, the McAllen ranch was a stash house for drug-trafficking, used to “package and transport marijuana.” The ranch was a warehouse to store and move drugs, not a residence “in which drugs were also stored.” Next, several bundles of marijuana were found in the ranch’s master bathroom, making it “plausible [the Court reasons] to find that either Rodriguez-Guerrero or another co-defendant accessed the master bedroom, where the shotgun was found.” Further, the rounds of ammunition suggest that the gun was connected with the drug trade. Lastly, the gun and rounds of ammunition were found on the same day that police observed Rodriguez-Guerrero and the co-defendants at the ranch.

The Court concludes that the “facts identified by the [district] court plausibly establish a temporal and spatial relationship between the weapon, the drug-trafficking activity, and Rodriguez-Guerrero.” The purpose of the sentencing enhancement is to punish because of increased danger and violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.11(A). “The mere fact that a weapon cannot be attributable to any specific drug trafficker does not decrease the danger of violence.” Even though Rodgriguez-Guerrero may not have possessed shotgun, or that he may not have known about the shotgun is irrelevant. The Court states, “there was [sufficient] evidence to support that the weapon must have been possessed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

In short, the Court says that establishing the “temporal and spatial” relationship is enough for possession in these types of drug trafficking cases; and, possession of a weapon could lead to enhanced, or increased prison sentences in federal courts.

Here's a Breaking Bad question for you: If Walt lets Jesse cook a batch of Meth and Jesse screws it up, such that it is unsellable, can they be punished for the amount of bad methamphetamine that they cooked in addition to the amount of good methamphetamine (if there were such a thing)? This 5th Circuit tells us in United States v. Ramirez-Olvera.

Antonio Ramirez-Olvera was convicted of possessing methamphetamine (meth) with the intent to distribute, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); he received a sentence of 240 months imprisonment, which is ten years below the bottom of the federal sentencing guidelines range for this offense.  Arguing that the district court excessively punished him, as the court did not distinguish between d-methamphetamine (“d-meth”) and l-methamphetamine (“l-meth”) for the sentencing guidelines’ equivalency table, Ramirez-Olvera appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District.

See the opinion in United States v. Ramirez-Olvera (5th Circuit, 2015)

How Should the Court Determine the Weight of Meth in a Possession Case?

The issue before the Court is whether federal courts must distinguish between the types of meth when deciding punishment, or, whether courts can punish based on a “lump sum” of the meth. As you can imagine, higher amounts generally mean a longer prison sentence.

Had the district court used only the d-meth in its calculations, Ramirez-Olvera’s prison sentence might have, in theory, been shorter. Relying on DEA lab reports,Ramirez-Olvera’s probation officer generated a presentence report that recommended, he “should be held responsible for 7.7 [total] grams,” combining both the l-meth and d-meth seized fromRamirez-Olvera’s home and car.

The Court discusses types of methamphetamine, highlighting the differences scientifically and practically. “D-meth and l-meth are stereoisomers of meth…consist[ing] of identical molecules [that are] differently arranged.” United States v. Acklen, 47 F.3d 739, 742 (5th Cir. 1995). D-meth causes psychological and physical changes in humans. L-meth, on the other hand, “produces little or no physiological effect when ingested.” Id. Further, L-meth is a “weak form of [meth], is rarely seen and is not made intentionally, but rather results from a botched attempt to produce d-meth.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(1)(2014). In other words, l-meth is an accidental byproduct when creating d-meth goes awry; L-meth has little to no cash value.

The Court reviews this case anew, focusing on the plain meaning of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for drug crimes; the Guidelines are the authoritative, controlling source of law. United States v. Moore, 733 F.3d 161-63 (5th Cir. 2013). Amendment 518, “a 1995 amendment to § 2D1.1, indicates that courts need not distinguish between d-meth and l-meth when determining the quantity of…meth attributable to a defendant.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, [Sentencing Commission Dicta], §2D1.1(c)(1)(2004). Under this amendment, “l-meth [is to] be treated the same as d-meth…thereby simplifying guideline application [from this point forward].” Id. Further, the Court “ha[s] relied on Amendment 518 to hold [in an unpublished case] that any distinction between d-meth and l-meth is now immaterial when calculating drug quantity under the guidelines. United States v. Beltran, 91 F. App’x 349 (5th Cir. 2004).

The Court affirms the district court’s opinion, holding that under Amendment 518 to the sentencing guidelines, meth no longer is to be categorized for sentencing purposes; l-meth and d-meth are to be added together to render the quantity courts will use in assessing punishment. All meth created, pure and botched, will be added together to determine a defendant’s prison sentence.

Is a Texas Public Intoxication charge a serious offense? What is the Possible Punishment for a PI in Tarrant County?

We often receive calls or emails from people in Tarrant County who have been arrested for or cited with Public Intoxication (PI) in Fort Worth. Typically, they contact us to determine how serious a PI charge is in Texas and what the possible punishment might be. They want to know whether this is something they should handle on their own or whether they need a criminal defense attorney to help.

Generally, Public Intoxication in Texas is a Class C misdemeanor. Some might tell you that a Class C misdemeanor is the same as a traffic ticket and that is somewhat true. However, some Class C convictions can have a much larger impact on your future than a simple speeding violation. So when someone asks me whether they need an attorney to help them handle a PI, I tell them yes. You won't need to pay an arm and a leg, but a criminal defense attorney can help ensure that your rights are protected throughout the process and can, hopefully, set your case up for a dismissal and an expunction down the road.

Public Intoxication Punishment When the Offender is 21 Years of Age or Older

Section 49.02(c) of the Texas Penal Code provides that Public Intoxication in Texas is a Class C Misdemeanor, which is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500.00. However, if a person has two prior Public Intoxication convictions on their record, a third PI can be enhanced to a Class B misdemeanor, which has a range of punishment of up to 180 days in the Tarrant County jail and a fine up to $2,000. This enhancement provision is one of the big reasons that it pays to hire an attorney for each and every Public Intoxication violation in Texas.

Should You Plead Guilty to a Public Intoxication Charge in Texas?

Sure it is easy to just plead guilty, pay the fine, and get on with life. However, a conviction for a PI, even though it is only a Class C offense, can have a lasting negative impact on your job prospects, military or college admissions, and more. As stated above, a PI conviction can also count toward a future enhancement charge or possible even evidence during sentencing in a DWI trial. If you do plead guilty, please do so after consultation with a criminal defense attorney in your area.

Public Intoxication Punishment When the Offender is Under 21 Years Old

There are different rules for persons under 21 in Texas. As you probably know, person under 21 are not allowed to consume any amount of alcohol, so the legislators drafted special rules for them. Section 49.02(e) of the Texas Penal Code Section relates to minors and states that minors would face the same punishment as if they committed an offense under Section 106.071 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. Here are the highlights for you:

• A person under 21 can be enhanced to a Class B misdemeanor for a 3rd PI, just like a person over 21 can
• A first time conviction for Public Intoxication can result in a driver’s license suspension.
• The fine for PI for a person under 21 is between $250 and $500.
• Mandatory community service.
• Alcohol education course or alcohol awareness program.

Fort Worth Public Intoxication Defense Attorneys

If you have been arrested in Tarrant County for Public Intoxication, contact our Fort Worth public intoxication defense attorneys today for a free consultation of your case. We can help you get your PI dismissed and then help you get the entire thing expunged from your record.  Call us today at (817) 993-9249.

When I think of someone impersonating an attorney, my mind goes to Joe Pesci and My Cousin Vinny.  In the movie Vincent Gambino only impersonated a criminal defense lawyer (not a public servant) so nobody seemed to care (except the judge), but in Texas, Impersonating Public Servant (including a district attorney) is a serious matter.  Robert Cornwell found this out after he pretended to be a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney in hopes of helping his friend with a DWI case.

In May of 2012, Robert Cornwell called Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney Kourtney Teaff, identifying himself as an assistant district attorney from Dallas County, attempting to “resolve [his friend’s] [DWI] case.” Cornwell claimed access to criminal histories, case files, and fingerprint cards. He mentioned speaking with governmental offices, and prosecuting his nephew for drug possession. Cornwell insisted on using his personal cell phone number because he and Teaff “were on the same team.” Becoming suspicious of the “highly unusual” requests coming from another district attorney, Teaff recorded the conversations. According to the trial court, Cornwell always used his real name, he had never been an attorney in Texas, he never attempted to claim official authority over Teaff, and he intended that “Teaff should consider the requests a personal favor.” Cornwell was sentenced to two years imprisonment for impersonating a public servant.

See the opinion in Cornwell v. State

What does "Impersonating a Public Servant" mean in Texas?

Impersonating a Public Servant is a Third Degree Felony with a punishment range of 2-10 years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine.  A person violates Section 37.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code when the person impersonates a public servant in combination with the requisite intent...[which] can be satisfied with either the submission theory (“with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority”) or the reliance theory (“with the intent to induce another…to rely on his pretended official acts.”).

Cornwell appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show either theory of intent—submission or reliance—because he did not persuade Teaff to submit to any asserted authority he might have over her. The Court of Appeals rejected Cornwell’s argument, “concluding that the evidence was…sufficient to support a jury finding that he had impersonated a public official with intent to induce another to rely on his pretended official acts—the reliance theory.” Cornwell then petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) for discretionary review.

Here, the CCA determines whether the Court of Appeals was incorrect in misconstruing the meaning of the Section 37.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, as only “a few Texas appellate courts have directly addressed the reliance theory of intent, and specifically, the meaning of pretended official acts.” See Ex Parte Niswanger, 335 S.W.3d at 617 & n.11; Tiller v. State, 362 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d.); Tovar v. State, 777 S.W.2d 481,489 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d.).

The CCA Clarifies what "Impersonating" means (and doesn't mean).

The CCA explained that Section 37.11(a)(1) can be broken down into two parts: the culpable act (actus reus, the bad act) and a culpable mental state (mens rea, the guilty mind). To violate the statute, the State must prove:

1. that the impersonation happened and
2. that the impersonator had the specific intent to induce another to submit or to rely upon.

“An accused may not be convicted on a simple showing that he falsely held himself out to be a public servant.”

Because it was undisputed that Cornwell did impersonate a public servant—an assistant district attorney from Dallas County—satisfying the first part of the statute, the CCA focused on Cornwell’s mental state, specifically the reliance theory—the evidence that shows Cornwell’s intent to induce another to rely upon his pretended official acts. The CCA explained that Cornwell attempted to persuade Teaff he was “an experienced assistant district attorney by relating various claims of conduct he had undertaken as an assistant district attorney” namely, “putting his nephew in jail, reviewing case files, and investigating matters in the capacity of assistant district attorney.” The CCA is adamant that, “the only reason [Cornwell] could have had for relaying these pretended official acts to Teaff was to enhance the credibility of his claim to be an assistant district attorney.” “By calling and speaking to an assistant district attorney as a member of the same team, [Cornwell]…hoped to gain [Teaff’s] trust and goodwill.” Further, Cornwell did not ask for favor[s] in his capacity as a private citizen or concerned friend, rather, he asked under the guise of being an assistant district attorney. The CCA states, such “purported actions exceed mere false identification as a public servant.” The CCA agreed with the Court of Appeals, affirming Cornwell’s conviction and sentence.

There are no shortcuts to due process. The Texas Penal Code prescribes strict punishment for those impersonating officers of the court. There is no doubt that criminal charges and allegations can make the accused feel panicked and overwhelmed, however, the old adage “desperate times call for desperate measures,” will not hold water in court where impersonation is concerned. If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, contact an actual Texas attorney who will explain the proper steps in dealing with the legal system. Contact our office today for a free consultation at (817) 993-9249.

While conducting a preventative patrol on the Fourth of July in 2013, a Fort Worth police officer stopped at a red light beside Cameron Byram’s vehicle. Both vehicles had the windows rolled down. The officer testified at trial that he noticed a female passenger in Byram’s car “hunched over…[and that he]…didn’t see any movement at all [from] the female.” The officer smelled alcohol coming from Byram’s car, and felt Byram was “not attending to the female passenger.” The officer shouted over to Byram, asking if she was alright, but Byram faced forward and drove away when the light turned green. Believing the female passenger needed medical attention, coupled with Byram’s actions “as an attempt to avoid contact with the police,” the officer stopped Byram’s car to conduct traffic stop. The officer checked on the passenger and called for medical attention, which she later refused. Next, the officer investigated and arrested Byram for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The officer testified that Byram had not committed a traffic offense, nor were there any technical violations on Byram’s car—he only stopped the car to perform a safety check.

Byram v. State (2nd Court of Appeals - Fort Worth, 2015)

***UPDATE - This case was REVERSED by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 2017. See opinion.

After his motion to suppress the evidence for the DWI charge was denied, Byram entered a guilty plea. The trial court assessed punishment at ninety days in jail and a $750 fine, but suspended the sentence, placing him on community supervision for eighteen months. Byram appealed.

The issue before the Fort Worth Court of Appeals is whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment applies to the facts of the case, or, whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Byram.

The Fourth Amendment provides a safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A warrantless arrest is considered unreasonable unless it fits into an exception, such as the community caretaking exception. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993); Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901. A search or seizure “is not unreasonable” when community caretaking is the goal, however, the exception is “narrowly applied” in the “most unusual of circumstances.” Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152.

“Courts consider four non-exclusive factors in determining whether the officer’s belief that the defendant needed help was reasonable: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone or had access to assistance other than that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others.” Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

First, the Court of Appeals concludes that the passenger did not exhibit distress. “The passenger did not appear to be in any great distress, she was located in a busy area of town where there were nearby hospitals, she was not alone [in the car], she was in public, and she did not appear to be a danger to herself or others.” Further, the Court of Appeals states, “We…cannot conclude that the…community caretaking exception, when applied to a hunched over passenger…indicates that the passenger presented a danger to herself or others.”

Second, the Court of Appeals determines that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to be able to perform a safety check. “[While] we do not question the good faith of [the officer’s] subjective suspicion that Byram might have been involved in an alcohol-based offense…so long as consumption of alcohol is not illegal…permitting…investigation of persons for alcohol-based offenses solely on whether the odor of alcohol is present invites unwarranted police intrusions.” Byram’s traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Justice Sue Walker dissents, stating the passenger was exhibiting signs of distress because she “was not moving and appeared unconscious.” The passenger was also in a vehicle driven by a man “who appeared unconcerned about her well-being.” The passenger’s access to assistance was doubtful because Byram did not respond to the police officer’s question about her condition. Lastly, the passenger was a danger to herself because she appeared unresponsive and unable to ask for help. “Thus, all four factors…support the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that she needed assistance.”

Law enforcement officers must abide by local, state and federal procedural and substantive laws when conducting traffic stops and arrests. If you or a loved one is facing DWI charges or traffic violations, please contact our office today for a free consultation at (817) 993-9249.