December 2015

Acquitted of the Underlying Assault that Necessitated a 911 Call, Defendant’s Guilty Verdict for Interference with 911 Call Upheld, Says the Second Court of Appeals

In February 2014, David Schumm and his wife were arguing in their home when she tried to place a 911 call. His wife testified that he prevented her from making the call by taking her cell phone. Fearing an assault, she ran outside, screaming for help. Schumm allegedly followed her outside, dragged her onto their porch and “strangled” her. At trial, Schumm denied all assaultive conduct and denied taking her cell phone. Schumm was charged in two separate cases with Interference with 911 Call and with Assault Family Violence with Impeding Breath. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.062 and § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2015). Schumm was acquitted of the felony assault charge at trial.

At a separate trial for the Interference with a 911 Call charge, the jury was allowed to hear that Schumm had been accused and tried for felony assault, however, the jury was not allowed to hear that he had been acquitted of the charge. Schumm’s attorney attempted to get a certified judgment of acquittal admitted into evidence, but the State’s relevance objection was upheld—the trial court prevented Schumm from disclosing to the jury his acquittal. Schumm appealed his conviction for Interference with a 911 Call on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the felony assault acquittal.

Read the court's opinion in Schumm v. State.

Interference with 911 Call | Interference with an Emergency Call

Under Texas Law, to be found guilty of interfering with an emergency call an (1) individual (2) knowingly (3) prevents or interferes with (4) another individual’s (5) ability to place an emergency call or to request help, including with a cell phone (6) from a law enforcement agency, (7) in an emergency...[“a condition in which an individual is…in fear of imminent assault.”]. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.062(a)-(d).

Appealing to the Second Court of Appeals, Schumm argues that the excluded evidence of his acquittal is relevant to the element of “emergency” (#7 above). He contends that because he was acquitted of “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing” of his wife, that there was no proof that an emergency actually existed, and that, because no emergency existed, not all of the elements of “interfering with an emergency call” have been fulfilled. In short, there is reasonable doubt that an emergency existed at all because he was acquitted of the underlying assault, and, because the trial testimony is her word against his.

Here, the Second Court of Appeals disagrees with Schumm, “yet the judgment of the acquittal [Schumm] sought to admit did not show that the felony jury had specifically found no emergency.” The jury did not find that Schumm’s wife was not in fear of an imminent assault at the time Schumm allegedly prevented her from using her cell phone. Instead, the felony jury found that the Schumm should be acquitted of the “assault by impeding breathing” charge. The Court notes that “emergency is not an element of assault by impeding breathing” and a “completed assault is not an element of the offense of interference with an emergency call.” Id. In short, the evidence had no bearing on whether Schumm’s wife feared an imminent assault when she tried to call 911; the Court does not address the possibility that there is reasonable doubt that an emergency existed in the first place. The Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of guilty.

Is Failure to Register as a Sex Offender a Sex Offense Itself?

At his trial, Eric Putnam pleaded guilty for “failure to register as a sex offender,” a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 that “carries a statutory range [of punishment] for supervised release of five years to life.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). A Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), calculated Putnam’s punishment for supervised release at 15 years, treating his conviction of Failure to Register as an additional sex offense under section 5D1.2(b)(2). PSRs are reports used by federal courts to assist the court in measuring a defendant’s punishment under the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Courts have discretion in determining type and length of punishment, sometimes deviating from the recommendation of the PSR. For Putnam, the district court adopted the PSR, sentencing him to ten months imprisonment followed by a supervised release term of 15 years.

See the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Putnam

Putnam appealed the 15-year term of supervised release, contending the district court erroneously treated his conviction for Failure to Register on the sex offender registry as a separate sex offense in and of itself. Because Putnam failed to object to the length of the sentence at the time of trial, essentially waiving his right to appeal the sentence on the merits, he must show (1) that a “plain error” was made at the sentencing phase of his trial, and, (2) that the “plain error” affected his substantial rights. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The “Plain Error Doctrine” refers to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) that permits federal courts of appeals to consider “plain errors” even though they were not brought to the district court’s attention at the time of trial.

Here, the government “concedes that a plain error [did] occur with respect to the Guidelines calculation for the length of…the supervised release term.” In earlier case law, the Fifth Circuit has held, “that failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act does not qualify as a sex offense under section 5D1.2(b)(2) of the Guidelines.” United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d, 323,329-31 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court agrees with the government and with Putnam—that a plain error did in fact occur at trial, and that the recommended sentence on the PSR should have included a supervised release from one to five years, instead of the range of five years to life.

Next, the Court explained, “Putnam has met his burden of showing that the [plain] error affected his substantial rights…[because] but for the district court’s misapplication of the [Sentencing] Guidelines, Putnam would have received a lesser sentence.” United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). A defendant meets the burden of showing that plain error affected his substantial rights when:

1. the district court mistakenly calculates the wrong Guidelines range;
2. the incorrect range is significantly higher than the true range; and
3. the defendant is sentenced incorrectly. Id.

Here, Putnam fulfills all three requirements—the district court miscalculated his range of punishment; the range was significantly higher (three times the correct amount); and Putnam was sentenced incorrectly. Although the courts may use discretion in sentencing—sometimes giving a longer sentence to a habitual offender, or someone with a long criminal history—Putnam had only one prior, lesser conviction. The district court did not have a compelling reason to go above the correct sentencing guidelines.

Lastly, the Court determined whether the plain error affected the “fairness, integrity, and reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Courts “often exercise…discretion to correct error when it result[s] in a custodial sentence in excess of the correct Guidelines recommendation.” United States v. Hernandez, 690 F.3d 623, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2012). Here, “miscalculation of a supervised release” is [un]common...but [nevertheless] is a substantial restraint on liberty.” United States v. Segura, 61 F.App’x 119, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003).

In sum, the Court concluded that there was, indeed, an error in Putnam’s case that resulted in a sentence ten years above the correct Guidelines range, “satisfying all the plain error inquiries.” The Court vacated the sentence and remanded to the district court for proper sentencing.

What is the New Campus Carry Law in Texas and What Does it Mean to Me?

Whether you love it or hate it, Campus Carry is coming to a college campus near you, and if you are a CHL holder, you need to know how to comply with the law. After lengthy debates in both houses of the Texas Legislature, Governor Greg Abbott signed Senate Bill 11 (“Campus Carry”) into Texas law on June 1, 2015. Campus Carry will go into effect on August 1, 2016 on the 50th anniversary of the University of Texas sniper shooting— one of the first mass murders on a college campus in the United States.

Who Can Carry a Handgun on a College Campus Under the Campus Carry Law?

Campus Carry permits all Concealed Handgun Licensees who are at least 21 years old, have passed state and federal criminal background checks, have successfully completed a firearms proficiency test and have completed Department of Public Safety-mandated training and education, to carry firearms inside of buildings belonging to public universities and some private institutions of higher education. The new legislation, however, does not mean open carry by anyone, anywhere, any time on all property owned by a public or private university. CHL licensees must take great care to research and to understand the limits of the Campus Carry law and how it impacts the way handguns are carried and stored, or potentially face legal consequences.

Can the Universities in Texas Make Their Own Rules With Campus Carry?

Campus Carry allows institutions of higher education to establish policies governing the storage of handguns by CHLs in dorms and residential facilities. Public universities may also create policies around athletic venues and events, deeming them off-limits to CHL licensees. Under current Texas law, bars, hospitals, churches, and public schools K-12 are off-limits to CHL licensees and will remain off-limits under Campus Carry—and it is important to note that most large public university systems have a teaching hospital, a K-12 practicum experience at public school, a chapel, or are near campus bars. Moreover, schools may create “no-gun zones” or “exclusion zones,” but must provide effective notice about such zones. Therefore, it is extremely important for those with a CHL to know exactly which areas are permitted to have handguns, which are not, and to make plan for storage it if the CHL licensee needs to go into an off-limits area. Students should carefully read their university’s Student Handbook and Campus Code of Conduct for more information.

Campus Carry removes criminal prohibitions in the Texas Penal Code on the possession of concealed handguns by concealed handgun licensees on the campuses. The new law provides institutions of higher education with immunity from liability for actions of CHLs on campus. Campus Carry mandates that an institution of higher education widely distribute the rules to the institution’s students, staff and faculty, including prominently publishing such provisions on the school’s website, and provide effective notice of the areas that are “exclusion zones.” Parents of college students may feel concerned with the new law and campus procedures.

The legislature granted rule-making authority to the presidents of the university system to create campus rules and policies pursuant to S.B. 11, with the only stipulation being that public institutions of higher learning may not “circumvent the intent” of Campus Carry by “imposing administrative bans and sanctions on CHLs on their campuses.” In order to comply with S.B.11, institutions of higher learning must submit a report every other year to the state legislature and to the standing committees that describe the campus rules and policies concerning CHL licensees and the schools must explain the reason the administration has established the provisions. Residents who live in college towns (even if they are not students) should also learn about Campus Carry and the implications of being a CHL at a campus library, sporting event, artistic venue, or even the university hospital.

This is no doubt a very interesting time for policy-making in Texas. Please note that this article is intended for informational purposes only and is subject to change as each public university system and private university determines campus policies based on S.B. 11. This article does not constitute or substitute legal advice. If you need legal advice, please contact our office at (817) 993-9249 for a free consultation.

For more information, see also the full Campus Carry Law, including a Bill Analysis and Fiscal Note or see our Frequently Asked Questions below.

Frequently Asked Questions About Texas Campus Carry

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What is Campus Carry?

Campus Carry refers to legislation, Senate Bill 11, signed into law last summer. Campus Carry will make it possible for licensed gun owners, over 21, to carry handguns onto public (and some private) institutions of higher education, in compliance with individual university policies.

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When will Campus Carry Take Effect?

Campus Carry will take effect on August 1, 2016—at the beginning of the 2016-2017 academic year.

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Do I have to have a Concealed Handgun License (“CHL”) to carry my handgun?

Yes. Campus Carry mandates that all gun owners must:
(1) pass federal and state background checks;
(2) be 21 years old (unless in the military);
(3) complete a firearms proficiency test; and,
(4) complete Department of Public Safety-mandated training and education.

It will be extremely important for every student with a CHL, to know exactly where to go with your handgun and to plan for where you will be able to legally store it if you must go into an off-limits area. Read your Student Handbook and Campus Code of Conduct for more information.

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Will Professors be able to carry guns?

Yes. Professors, administrators, faculty, staff and visitors may carry under the Campus Carry law, provided they are in compliance with the law and campus policies.

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Does a private school have to follow Campus Carry?

Maybe. Private institutions may establish policies that prohibit CHLs. So far, the following schools have “opted out” of Campus Carry.

• Rice University
• Texas Christian University (TCU)

NOTE: This information is subject to change and it is up to each student, to know if your school has opted out.

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Can a student at a public university take a gun anywhere on campus?

Not necessarily. Campus Carry allows institutions of higher education to establish policies governing the storage of handguns by CHLs in dorms and residential facilities. The public university may also create policies around athletic venues and events, as off-limits to CHLs. Under current Texas law, bars, hospitals, churches, and public schools K-12 are off-limits to CHLs and will remain off-limits under Campus Carry—and most large public university systems have a teaching hospital, a K-12 practicum experience at public school, a chapel, or are near campus bars. Schools may create “no-gun zones” or “exclusion zones,” but must provide effective notice about such zones.

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Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorneys

Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC is a criminal defense law firm located in Fort Worth, Texas. Our attorneys handle all felony and misdemeanor charges in the Fort Worth, Tarrant County area. If you have questions about this post or need more information about Campus Carry, please contact us at (817) 993-9249.

I know this post has nothing to do with Fort Worth Criminal Defense or Texas Criminal Law, but as a Marine officer and Reserve Military Judge, I am often asked about the threats facing our Marines and our nation.  As I was watching President Obama tonight talk about the terrorist attack in San Bernardino and the terror group ISIL, a friend of mine asked, "Why is he saying ISIL? Doesn't he mean ISIS?"

Is there a difference between ISIS and ISIL?

The answer is yes (kind of).  The President knew exactly what he was saying.  ISIL stands for the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant."  ISIS stands for the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria."  ISIL is really the next (and bigger) iteration of ISIS.  The Levant is a large area in the middle east that is being held by ISIL.  However, since ISIS has become a household name, most news agencies continue to say ISIS, when ISIL is the correct name.

Want to Learn More About ISIL's Ideology and How ISIL Grew to Power?

Check out the video below of a Marine Corps briefing by Dr. Sebastion Gorka, one of the nation's leading experts on Islamic terrorism. This is an actual brief that was provided to high ranking Marine officers. I will warn you, this video is long. One hour long, to be exact. But as Dr. Gorka points out at the beginning of the video, he teaches a 16-week course on this topic, so one hour is really only the wavetops.  If you are the type who likes to post your opinions about this topic on social media, you should really take the time to watch this video.  Enjoy.

"Run, Baby, Run!" Girlfriend’s Warnings, Personal Tattoos, and Attempts to Flee From US Marshals, Do Not Rise to the Level of “Felony Hindering Apprehension” Says the CCA

Keiona Nowlin and her boyfriend, Demarcus Degrate, were riding in a car when a United States Marshal, executing a sealed, federal warrant on the boyfriend, pulled up behind them. After the Marshal activated the siren and lights, the couple pulled over and Degrate fled on foot. The Marshal chased Degrate. Moments later, as two Marshals arrived at the scene, they observed Nowlin screaming, “Run baby run…get away” while she also fled on foot. The Marshals detained Nowlin “to find out why she was running.” At that point, Nowlin fled the Marshals’ car. Nowlin was placed under arrest for escape.

See the CCA Opinion in Nowlin v. State.

After the arrest, Nowlin said she “knew the cars the Marshals drove…and…did not want Degrate to be arrested…[because] he was out on bond for state charges.” The Marshal noted that Nowlin had Degrate’s name tattooed near her collarbone; the trial court inferred the tattoo as indicative of an intimate relationship. The trial court found Nowlin guilty of third-degree felony hindering apprehension, sentencing her to four years imprisonment.

Nowlin appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that she was not warning Degrate of impending apprehension because “he was already aware of the [Marshal’s] presence.” Nowlin contended that because she did not know the contents of the sealed federal warrant, she could not have known Degrate was charged with a felony. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that her statement at the scene, “run baby run…get away,” provided sufficient evidence of providing a warning to Degrate. The court of appeals pointed to statements made at the scene that she knew “he was out on bond for state charges…and…she did not want her man to get arrested.” The court of appeals added that her tattoo was proof of her close relationship with Degrate, and that she likely knew of the felony-level charges he was facing.

Nowlin appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that because the federal indictment was sealed and secret, she could not have known about the indictment itself; that no evidence exists that she knew of the felony-level charges Degrate faced; and, that her tattoo was not proof of a close relationship where she would have had knowledge of the charges. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient: that the tattoo is evidence of a close relationship that implies she knew intimate details of Degrate’s life; that she knew Degrate faced serious state-level charges, and that her attempt to flee from the US Marshal is evidence of her knowledge of the “serious nature of Degrate’s crimes.” In an interesting turn of events, the State offered an alternative to acquittal--that an alternative charge could be misdemeanor-level hindering apprehension, and the sentence could be amended to reflect a lesser charge.

“In order to show that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support a conviction of felony hindering apprehension, the State must prove:

1. the defendant warned another person of impending discovery or apprehension;
2. the defendant had the intent to hinder that individual’s arrest; and,
3. the defendant had knowledge that the individual was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony.

Tex.Penal Code § 38.05(a), (d).

An individual acts with knowledge when he is aware that the circumstances exist. Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(b). In a nutshell, the State must show Nowlin was aware that her boyfriend was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) now decides whether the evidence is sufficient to show that Nowlin knew Degrate was charged with a felony offense.

Here, the CCA does not agree with the trial court and court of appeals. “The state offense that Degrate was on bond for cannot serve as the basis for [Nowlin’s] conviction.” The CCA notes that there was no evidence at trial that named the type and level of the state offense, therefore, the trial court had no way of knowing if the offense was a felony or not. Also, there was no mention of whether Nowlin knew what type of charge her boyfriend was facing. Therefore, because there was insufficient evidence regarding the state offense, the state offense cannot serve as the basis for Nowlin’s conviction.

Further, Degrate’s federal indictment was sealed. There was no way for Nowlin and Degrate to know about the charges before their arrests. “With this mandated secrecy and the lack of evidence that he was told about the indictment during the attempt to arrest him, Degrate could not have known that he was under indictment for felon in possession of a firearm.” It would have been impossible for Degrate to have told Nowlin about the felony charge because he would not have known about it.

Lastly, the inferences made about Nowlin’s close relationship with Degrate—including the tattoo on her collarbone and her attempt to escape the Marshall—do not apply here. “While the inferences that the court of appeals makes would likely be reasonable ones had there been any evidence of Degrate himself having knowledge of the indictment, no such evidence was ever presented.”

The CCA found that the evidence was insufficient to support a felony-level hindering apprehension charge. The CCA reforms Nowlin’s convictions to a misdemeanor hindering apprehension charge, instructing the trial court to conduct a new punishment hearing to reflect the lesser charge.